National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

## NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

## AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

Canada

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

# THE BALKAN CRISIS: A TEST FOR THE EMERGING WESTERN ORDER

BY

DEMETRIOS GLENTZAKOS

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Edmonton, Alberta
FALL 1993

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

*Your file Votre référence*

*Our file Notre référence*

**The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.**

**L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.**

**The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.**

**L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.**

ISBN 0-315-88285-9

Canada

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR: Demetrios Glentzakos

TITLE OF THESIS: The Balkan Crisis: A Test for the Emerging Western Order

DEGREE: Master of Arts

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: 1993

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Library to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as hereinbefore provided neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatever without the author's prior written permission.



#6, 10656 - 102 Street
Edmonton, Alberta
T5H 2T5

31 May 1993

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE BALKAN CRISIS: A TEST FOR THE EMERGING WESTERN ORDER submitted by Demetrios Glentzakos in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Tom Keating

Laurie Adkin

John-Paul Himka

31 May 1993

To Michelle

ABSTRACT

The Balkan Crisis, and more specifically the war in the former Yugoslavia, is bringing to the forefront the main dilemmas confronting international actors, states and institutions, and provides an opportunity to explore the status of institutions in the post-Cold War order. The passage to post-Communist Europe has been crisis-ridden, and supranational actors like the European Community [EC] and NATO, as well as international institutions like the United Nations [UN] and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], appear unprepared to confront the waves of turmoil that have appeared in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Their mandates and institutional structures are in need of re-orientation towards confronting the challenges of the post-Communist era. A process of institutional redefinition has already begun in all major international institutions and is being shaped by the complexity of the Balkan Crisis, which at time of writing, has proven many institutional responses to be uninfluential. Despite the mediation, peacekeeping and monitoring activities of international organizations, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia continues almost unabated. In their attempts to transform their functions and capabilities for the long-term, and in order to respond to the Balkan Crisis at the present, international institutions are attempting to expand their jurisdictional boundaries and redefine their roles. During this process, their mandates

increasingly overlap. The major Western states--the United States, Germany, France, and Britain--are all attentive to the institutional changes that are taking place and are attempting to influence this process to accommodate their interests and institutional visions of the post-Cold War order. In doing so, they at times interfere with or influence the role that these institutions play in the Balkan Crisis. However, it seems that there is a broad convergence of interests and views among institutions and states concerning security in the post-Cold War order. It seems that the post-Cold War order will facilitate a higher level of institutional cohesion, cooperation and integration. It is uncertain, however, whether some fundamental weaknesses of international institutions can be surpassed to the point where a Balkan-type crisis can be prevented or even halted.

An important characteristic of the post-Cold War era in relation to Europe and the Balkans, is the greater influence of the European Community on the extra-economic sphere. The 'supranational influence' of the EC is expanding, creating a new context for relations between Balkan and non-Balkan states. Despite a number of setbacks that the EC has faced as a result of competition between member-states on a number of fronts, the EC is proving to be a stabilizing force in the Balkan region. Although the conflict between the ethnic groups continues in the former Yugoslavia, the surrounding Balkan states appear attentive to international mediation. The potential of this to contain the southern expansion of the

crisis, is still a real possibility.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to use the completion of this thesis as an opportunity to thank all those who shared the difficulties of this project, as well as those who had previously laid the foundations through their teaching and counselling.

I am greatly indebted: to my supervisor Tom Keating for his insightful guidance, patience and support, which helped me to safely pursue my ambitions in this project and to develop my thinking; to Laurie Adkin, for the seriousness and attention that she paid to this work from the initial stages to the end, which in my view, greatly surpassed the obligations of a committee member and enhanced the quality of this work; and to John-Paul Himka (Department of History) for his contribution as a committee member and his helpful comments on Balkan history. A special thank you to Professor Fred Judson for his inspirational teachings and friendship, which had the most positive influence in a turning point in my life, and to all those from whose teachings I benefitted: Linda Trimble, Tom Pocklington, Paul Johnson, Judith Garber, Bob Gilsdorf, Tom Keating, and Laurie Adkin.

I thank Michelle Gregersen and Marthese Cassar for their typing and technical assistance. Thank you also to Michelle Gregersen, Robin Boodle and Paul Hamilton for their participation in an excellent 'mock thesis defense'. I also thank Stamatina Stathaki and Gurcan Kocan for interesting discussions on the Balkan crisis.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**


**INTRODUCTION** . . . . . 1

**CHAPTER ONE: The Balkan Imbroglio** . . . . . 13

THE EFFECTS OF BALKAN HISTORY . . . . . 16

THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA . . . . . 21

MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS . . . . . 23

THE SERBO-CROATIAN CONFLICT . . . . . 27

THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY . . . 34

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: THE CRISIS SPREADS . . . . . 40

A WIDENING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE EFFORTS . . . . 44

SOUTHWARD EXPANSION OF THE CONFLICT . . . . . 51

MACEDONIAN NATIONALISM: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY . . . . . 53

GREEK FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . 69

CONCLUSION . . . . . 73

**CHAPTER TWO: International Actors and the Balkan Crisis in the Post-Cold War Order** . . . . . 76

WESTERN EUROPE, THE EC AND THE BALKANS . . . . . 78

EC INCENTIVES FOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKAN IMBROGLIO . . . . . 80

THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AND FRANCO-GERMAN COMPETITION . . . . . 95

NATO . . . . . 105

THE UNITED STATES . . . . . 108

INSTITUTIONAL REDEFINITION AND COOPERATION . . . . 118

The United Nations . . . . . 118

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] . . . . . 123

SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 127

**CONCLUSION** . . . . . 135

**APPENDIX** (1991 map of Yugoslavia) . . . . . .150

## ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| Bosnian Democratic Party | BDP |
| Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe | CSCE |
| Conflict Prevention Centre | CPC |
| Croatian Democratic Community | CDC |
| Democratic Party for Action (Bosnia-Herzegovina) | PDA |
| European Community | EC |
| European Community Monitor Mission | ECMM |
| Federal Republic of Yugoslavia | FRY |
| High Commissioner for National Minorities | HCNM |
| Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization | IMRO |
| Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity | IMRO-DPMNU |
| International Conference Organization (of Muslim nations) | ICO |
| International Committee of the Red Cross | ICRC |
| New Democracy Party (of Greece) | ND |
| North Atlantic Treaty Organization | NATO |
| Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party of Greece | PASOK |
| Serbian Democratic Party | SDP |
| Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia | SFRY |
| United Nations | UN |
| United Nations Commission for Refugees | UNHCR |
| United Nations Protection Forces | UNPROFOR |
| United States of America | U.S. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Vardar Macedonian Revolutionary Organization | VMRO |
| Western European Union | WEU |
| Yugoslavian People's Army | JNA |

# INTRODUCTION

Europe's south-eastern region (the Balkans) has once again come to the centre of international attention. The break-up of former Yugoslavia and the civil war that has erupted between the (Serbs, Croats and Muslims) main ethnic groups, has also revived old antagonisms among Balkan and non-Balkan states. In the post-Cold War era, the threat of an outright Balkan war is more real than ever and the avoidance of such a war depends both on the ability of Balkan states to negotiate their differences and the role that non-Balkan states and international organizations will play in the resolution of the crisis. Already the war in former Yugoslavia has involved outside actors in various forms. States have shown their support for the ethnic groups in numerous ways, have acted as mediators, or have used their influence within international organizations to provide support for their particular visions of conflict resolution. International organizations have been involved in mediation activities at times competing for a role and at other times cooperating with each other.

The Yugoslavian war, the tensions among neighbouring Balkan states, as well as the involvement of other international actors, are occurring amidst a rapidly changing international environment where every actor is involved in a

process of redefining its role and status in the emerging post-Cold War international order. At times the motives of states and international organizations involved in the Yugoslavian war and in larger Balkan problems include humanitarian considerations (human rights), respect for international laws and conventions, and concerns for peace. More frequently, however, the crisis appears to be an opportunity for a particular international actor to advance its vision for the new international order and its role in this order. Involvement in the Balkan region, whatever the form, often can be related to particular state interests and to different visions of European security in the post-Cold War era.

The Balkan crisis cannot be fully understood without accounting for and placing into perspective historical differences between those nation-states and ethnicities in the Balkan region. Although it is important to account for such differences, it is also important to realize that if reliable solutions are to be found, they must be based on developments that will not have any historical parallel in the region. These would include the involvement and guarantees of European and transatlantic organizations and not simply depend upon the support that states would provide to the contending actors in the Yugoslavian conflict. Even if, on the other hand, the crisis is to proliferate, the role of institutions like the European Community [EC], the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], the United Nations [UN], NATO and the Western European Union [WEU] should be fundamental in any analysis that will attempt to explain such a development. In both cases, one has to examine the influence of these institutions in the Balkans, and has to evaluate the implications that the crisis has on the evolution of these organizations. How has the 'management' of the crisis brought forward the inadequacies of these institutions, forced new links between them, provided incentives for restructuring or affirmed traditional roles? How will Balkan security in the future be influenced by the re-allocation and redefinition of authority that seems to be taking place in these international organizations? In short, despite some historical continuities, it is necessary for us to realize that the impact of the international environment on the Balkan region is more different from than similar to the past, and that the implications the Balkan crisis has for other international actors are for the most part historically unique and require an innovative analysis. Such an analysis should revolve around certain (or key) themes. The relations between states, the actions of the mediators and the mediated and the role of international organizations, can be understood only if we place them within the context of some central underlying contradictions and tensions prevalent in the post-Cold War era.

The first theme prevalent in this work involves the

struggle between nationalism[1] and supranationalism. In this work, the two concepts are used as descriptive categories that classify political developments as conducive or not towards the emergence of a normatively and institutionally more cohesive new world order. Developments classified under nationalism are seen to endanger or delay the emergence of a world order that is capable of confronting through institutional initiatives and state action, challenges such as the Balkan crisis. Political developments that strengthen supranational entities or ones that are influenced by them, are seen, on the other hand, as accommodating the emergence of such an order. Here the European Community plays a central role in this work as a supranational entity. The process of economic and political integration of the European Community member-states is directly influenced by and greatly influences the Balkan imbroglio.

The European experiment is directly dependent upon a stable Europe and a peaceful periphery. This necessitates an analysis of the relationship between the Balkan crisis and the

---

[1] Nationalism here is used in a dual sense, referring both to an ethnocentric ideology that falsely exaggerates the threat to the nation by outsiders and the attempts by nations to outmanoeuvre other nation-states in international organizations by following an excessively selfish approach to international problems, endangering the supranational process. In this thesis, 'nationalism' is used as a descriptive category under which shifts in public opinion and particular policies of states are classified. The focus of this work does not allow me to address the theoretical debate on nationalism by theorists such as E. J. Hobsbawn, Anthony Smith, Benedict Anderson, etc..

role of the European Community. States inside and outside the EC have faced repeatedly the dilemma of choosing between old nationalist and new supra-nationalist politics. An independent national foreign policy, one that is not in line with the overall objectives of the European Community may prevail at times, satisfying the national sentiment of a particular country, while endangering a country's supranational objectives. Often an assertive nationalist policy can enhance a country's strength in the new supranational institutions, but it can also result in isolating the country. At times, the balance that countries seek between a nationalist and supranationalist foreign policy, frequently shifts toward the nationalist position due to changes in public opinion. This is particularly evident in governments' approaches to the Yugoslavian civil war.

The end of the Cold War has challenged orthodoxies about the role of international organizations and has paved the way for institutional competition as well as institutional redefinition. This represents a second prevalent theme in this work. In the post-Cold War order a new set of security considerations are confronting Europe. The end of the Soviet threat, nuclear and conventional, has given way to the threat of nuclear proliferation, rising nationalisms, ethnic strife, and territorial disputes. Eastern Europe and the Balkans are providing serious challenges to European and transatlantic institutions whose roles and structures were formed and

consolidated within the context of the Cold War. Changes are taking place that reflect institutional adaptation to the changing international conditions. In doing so, institutions expose their particular visions about their positions within the new world order and the roles they prefer to assign to others--institutions and states. Observing this re-arrangement of responsibilities, the re-emergence of institutions like the WEU, and the new challenges to old institutions (like NATO), one is able to place into perspective the institutional responses to the Balkan crisis. In an overall context of institutional re-definition and restructuring, the Balkan crisis appears as a convenient testing-ground for new institutional visions. Simultaneously, states are exerting their influence on international institutions at times to enhance their influence vis a vis other states--as the Franco-German competition will illustrate--and, at other times to shape the institutional future of the post-Cold War order to their liking. In particular, the roles taken by such major states as France, Britain, the U.S., Germany, and Italy in the Balkans, can be explained in part in relation to their perspectives and competing visions of a future European security order. These state visions, as well as narrow state interests, have at times interfered with the role of international institutions while at other times have accommodated institutional responses to the crisis. The influence that the permanent members of

the Security Council, and especially the U.S., have over the UN and the competition triggered by Germany's hegemonic position within the EC, may be seen as either limiting or enhancing the effectiveness of these institutions in confronting the challenges of the Balkan crisis.

Normative changes in international relations as they are reflected in the discourse and actions of international organizations and states is the third main theme of this work. The development of this theme will contribute to explaining the way norms and morals have influenced the behaviour of international actors as well as highlight constraints and incentives that post-Cold War norms are placing upon actors. The post-Cold War, post-Gulf war environment seems normatively more cohesive and united. The collapse of the Communist system and the emergence of a democratic capitalist order has eliminated from international discourse and practice the competition between two mutually exclusive world views.[2] This 'victory' of the Western world however, has been accompanied by new challenges. The Western order that is emerging has not yet solidified. The Balkans and Eastern Europe are serious

---

[2] It should be noted from the start, however, that this new democratic capitalist order centres around the interests and the goals of Western states. Therefore, whenever I refer to the enhanced possibilities of this new order in international cooperation between international institutions and states in the domain of security, I am referring to the European scene. Although many of the arguments may apply to other parts of the world it is beyond the goals and capacity of this work to discuss them.

challenges to the victors who must ensure the viability of the emerging democracies through institutional and state action. In the new Western order a minimal consensus is emerging where democratic freedoms, respect for human and minority rights, are becoming more than abstract principles. It appears that a more collectively interventionist order is emerging, characterized by a readiness to challenge violators of international norms and conventions. Supportive incentives (financial aid) and non-supportive incentives (sanctions, trade barriers) by international organizations and states are exercised collectively by the 'protectors' (international institutions and states) of the new Western order, demonstrating an upsurge in interventionist policies.

The three aforementioned themes, i.e. the conflict of nationalism with supranationalism, institutional competition, and normative changes in the post-Cold War era, will be used as a framework that will explain and situate the actions of international actors. The first chapter will be an introduction to the historical problems of the Balkans and their relation to the present crisis. Here, I will attempt to isolate important historical factors that continue to have an effect on the politics of the region, but at the same time avoid an historicist explanation. While acknowledging the influence of history in the region, I will attempt to show how the conflict between nationalism and supranationalism can be viewed in the way governments and publics both promote and

resist nationalist politics. The impact of nationalism both as an historical phenomenon in the region and as a contemporary force endangering negotiations in the region, will also be discussed. A main goal of this chapter is to provide a relatively detailed account of the actions of the main actors involved directly or indirectly in the Balkan Crisis.

In this chapter I will also examine the Macedonian question since it is the view of this author that its resolution is fundamental to the avoidance of a Balkan war. The struggle of nationalist and supranationalist forces will be observed, as the mediation of the European Community encounters stiff resistance from nations and ethnic groups in the region, which, while attentive to supranationalist incentives, frequently tend to follow nationalist directions. The 'supranational influence' of the European Community and the strengthening of democracies in the Balkans are seen as fundamental changes that appear capable of overriding traditional animosities.

However, integral to peace in the Balkans, is the ability of international actors to help end the war in former Yugoslavia. A cohesive international response that forces space for negotiation and puts a stop to the killing of civilians is a fundamental pre-condition for a broader Balkan solution, and a return to 'normalcy'. In the second chapter, I will attempt to explain the multiple ways in which the war

in former Yugoslavia and the Balkan crisis affects the major international actors. My aim is to evaluate the institutional transformation that is taking place as it relates to the capacity of post-Cold War institutions to confront the present crisis and prevent its resurgence. My view is that the competition among European states and international institutions has limited the effectiveness of the international response to the Balkan Crisis. It has also brought forward the limitations confronting institutions like the EC, the CSCE, UN and NATO in dealing with such a crisis. However, as the awareness of these limitations grows, greater institutional cooperation and a stronger role for supranational actors, like the EC, seems to be the trend in post-Communist Europe. This trend is not free of competition between institutions and among states but this competition does not seem threatening to the emerging consensus in the post-Cold War order. Thus, differences between major states such as France and Germany over the institutional future of Europe or over the proper response to the Balkan Crisis, even when they become points of contention, did not deviate from what is 'acceptable' in international institutions. While the aim of this chapter is to argue that an institutionally and normatively more cohesive international order seems to be emerging as a consequence of the collapse of Communism and the unifying effects of the Balkan and East European challenges, it is also aiming at exposing the obstacles confronting the

emerging order.

# CHAPTER ONE:

## The Balkan Imbroglio

The multiplicity and complexity of politics in the Balkan region forces any student of the Balkans to be eclectic in choosing the parameters of the study, particularly when one examines the present crisis. The war in former Yugoslavia is presently the core of the crisis, and the possibility of a southern expansion of the conflict to Macedonia and Kosovo, and the potential engagement of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey in a Balkan war, is seen by many as the biggest threat. Consequently, not all serious issues and differences between Balkan states will be discussed, but only those containing a real threat to peace. The rise of nationalism in the Balkans, the re-awakening of old animosities and ambitions, and the emergence of new nation-states are factors that may perpetuate and exaggerate perennial Balkan problems. While the goal of the overall work is to situate and understand the Balkan Crisis within the broader international context, this particular chapter will be an introduction to the unique conditions of the Balkan scene, both historical and contemporary. It will also trace the events leading up to and will follow the development of the crisis in former

Yugoslavia.[3] The goal of the chapter is to demonstrate the high level of outside involvement that this crisis has provoked and will therefore account for the actions of both Balkan and non-Balkan actors. By giving a detailed account on the one hand of the enormous degree of international involvement, and on the other of the defiant determination of the contending forces in former Yugoslavia to accomplish their nationalist objectives, I hope to illustrate that the absence of democratic experiences, and the suppression of ethnic politics in post-Communist Yugoslavia by the respective nationalist movements (Serbian and Croatian) created a fertile ground for the re-emergence of Balkan nationalism. Although in the following chapter I will attempt to argue that the emerging democratic capitalist status quo contains strong potential for institutional development, and that the Balkan Crisis has contributed to the re-orientation, hastening and convergence of the activities of international institutions in ways that strengthen collective security, in this chapter my aim is to present that this same international status quo appeared unprepared to deal with and at times divided in its response to the Balkan Crisis. However, despite inconsistencies, the international response through peacekeeping, mediation and aid has contained the intensity and scope of the crisis. In both chapters, the European

---

[3] A map of the former Yugoslavia, located in the Appendix, has been included for consultation and clarification.

Community [EC] is seen as having a democratizing and stabilizing influence for the long term, as it relates to international security. For the short term, however, the EC had little effect in resolving the war in former Yugoslavia, but a more positive influence on the politics of the surrounding Balkan states. In both chapters the activities of the UN, the WEU, the CSCE, the EC and NATO, are seen as limited but also as indicative of a new era characterized by increased cooperation between international organizations.

THE EFFECTS OF BALKAN HISTORY

The historical roots of the present crisis hark back to the years of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule, and the process in which Balkan peoples attempted to gain independence from these empires. The present nationalisms that are re-emerging in the region have drawn their power from the historical divisions and animosities left by the two World Wars, the impact of Communism on the region (both as an ideology and as a hegemonic political system), and the diversity of ethnic populations, religions and cultures. Whatever the outcome of the present crisis, Balkan nationalism continues to be a potent force in the region, as in the past. Its devastating effects can be seen in the intensity and brutality of the different ethnic groups now warring in former Yugoslavia. Its impact can also be felt in the politics of the surrounding Balkan states. Here however, democratic politics, the EC's supranational influence, and international

involvement and mediation have provided hope for a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

In its history the Balkan region has been one of the most explosive regions in the world. It has been occupied by a succession of empires--Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian. It has experienced countless revolts, gone through immense demographic changes, and has always been inhabited by a mosaic of peoples. In its recent history, the region has experienced major wars involving states, genocide and assimilation of peoples, exchanges of populations, and waves of nationalism that were responsible for the aforementioned events. When approaching the Balkans from an analysis of the present crisis, one naturally focuses on the historical divisions that have characterized the area. The similarities between the present crisis and the Balkan Wars in the beginning of this century cannot go unnoticed. It is duly noted that the historical experiences of Balkan peoples and states continue to have a powerful influence on the relations between Balkan states today. Whenever a dispute arises within the Balkans between two peoples or two states, the opposing sides uncover plenty of historical evidence to prove that they stand on the moral high ground. Acts of aggression, provocation, and atrocities (the latter seem to multiply in the war in former Yugoslavia) are justified on the basis of

previous evils committed in the past by the 'enemy'.[4] Balkan peoples, in whatever state they belong, attribute their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and national identities to the struggles of previous generations against their enemies. In the Balkans this is not simply a nationalist myth, but a reality, since war and resistance were the determining factors that established the position of states and peoples within the region.

The Ottoman empire, which occupied the Balkans from the 15th to the 19th century, established the conditions that have made the region one of the most volatile in the world. Ottoman domination caused massive population flows into and out of the region which evolved into the mosaic that characterizes the Balkans today. From the 17th century onwards, the Ottoman Empire experienced a steady decline because of internal corruption, inflexibility and pressures from the West. In the 19th century successive revolts by Balkan peoples (Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians), contributed to its downfall. With guarantees from the Great Powers, one after another of the Balkan states was established by nationalist-ethnic movements. Each state attempted to incorporate certain territories and peoples and to homogenize their populations. By 1912, an alliance of nations consisting

---

[4] Serbian nationalists justify their present aggression and justify the annexation of territory in Croatia by recalling the treatment of Serbs by Croats cooperating with the Nazis in the Second World War.

of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, fought and defeated the Turkish rulers. Within one year (1913) Greece, Serbia and Romania were fighting against Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War when the latter attempted to extend its territory to Macedonia and Thrace.[5] Ironically, eighty years later one can still identify a Greek, Serbian and Romanian alliance opposing Bulgaria, Turkey, Albania and 'Macedonia' this time initiated by the war in former Yugoslavia.[6] As in the past, today's nationalisms arise and develop in response to one another, and as in the past, the 'Macedonian Question' continues to be a point of contention among Balkan states. As in the past a religious dimension is also prevalent in the crisis.

The experience of many Balkan states with communist rule, and the proclaimed internationalism of that system, paradoxically strengthened rather than weakened the forces of nationalism in the region. In Romania, Ceaucescu capitalized on nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiment to consolidate his position. In Albania, Hoxha capitalized on the autonomy of the Albanian nation and created a regime that tied its philosophy of political isolation to a nationalist agenda.

---

[5] Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio (Westview Press, 1991), 2; Aurel Braun, Small-State Security in the Balkans (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1983), 31.

[6] Stephen Bowers, "Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe" Conflict Studies 248 (1992): 1-26; Stephen Larrabee, "Instability and Change in the Balkans" Survival 34, no.2 (1992): 31-49; James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question" International Affairs, 68 (1992): 175-183.

Yugoslavia was the only Communist state which consolidated its position by declaring its opposition to the Soviet bloc and by leading the non-aligned movement but unlike other communist states, no unified Yugoslavian nation emerged. Nationalism in Yugoslavia was preserved in the federation by securing political representation of the different nationalities within the communist state. It is important to note here--despite the absence of political democracy and the authoritarianism of the system--communist Yugoslavia was a balanced political system for all intents and purposes, with regard to ethnic politics. The transition to democracy opened room for political opportunism and nationalist adventurism that was not possible in the previous system.

As with the other post-communist nation-states, Yugoslavia has no democratic experience. While people have participated in political organizations, committees, etc., there was no experience of democratic dialogue, opposition and criticism within the system. This environment proved fertile ground for nationalist appeals. Democracy was introduced not as a political system to be learned and practised but as a battleground for nationalist contenders. In the words of Licht and Kaldor (1992),

> *So it was in part by default that nationalism became the new mobilising ideal. Nationalism held a particular attraction for people looking for new identities but too disgusted to revive ideas of class and too impatient to comprehend the notion of citizenship. In the backlash against the old system, professional or social identities were discredited. Anyone who had succeeded in a career*

> *was implicated in the old regime. Anyone who was a dissident stood out as an accusing reminder of other people's complicity. To be a Serb, Croat, or Slovene was to have a safe, untainted identity.*[7]

It was the re-emergence of nationalist movements and the political opportunism of leaders who capitalized on nationalist agendas that were for the most part responsible for the conflict that has arisen. In an environment characterized by economic uncertainty, rapid social change, and political inexperience with democratic institutions, the nationalist appeals found a fertile ground. Small incidents of ethnic aggression were blown out of proportion, triggering more ethnic aggression. A 'Pandora's box' was opened and its force is threatening the stability of the whole region.

The discussion that follows will give an overview of the events leading up to the outbreak of civil war in the former Yugoslavia and will present the actors involved (both internally and internationally) giving a account of their actions and involvement. Its function is to establish the most important facts of the crisis and stand as a point of reference for the rest of the text.

THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA

The steady deterioration of relations between the republics of Slovenia and Croatia and the republic of Serbia, relations between the federal Army and the federal parliament,

---

[7] Sonja Licht and Mary Kaldor, "Nationalism and War, Civil Society and Peace" in Breakdown: War and Reconstruction in Yugoslavia (U.K.: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1992), 8.

and between the various ethnic groups (Croats, Serbs and Muslims), led to the outbreak of violence in Croatia and Slovenia beginning in June 1991. These events have culminated in the spread of violence to the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time of writing.

The predominantly Serbian parliament had attempted unsuccessfully to maintain unity by appealing to "Yugoslavian" nationalist sentiment. In September 1990, Serbia adopted a new constitution, "which, itself a product of specific Serbian national interests, established both the right to declare self-determination and the right to secede" and was not met with the same intense opposition from the federal parliament as were later attempts by Croatia and Slovenia to establish similar constitutional amendments.[8] This constitution included multiparty elections, guarantees of personal, political, economic and social rights and freedoms, and virtually banned censorship of the media. The word 'socialist' was dropped from the republic's name, and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo were integrated into the republic of Serbia.[9] Therefore, Serbia, having the two provinces under its jurisdiction and the support of the Montenegrin republic (equalling three federal votes),

---

[8] Milan Andrejevich, "A Week of Great Political Importance," Report on Eastern Europe, 18 Jan 1991, 29.

[9] Report on Eastern Europe, 12 Oct 1990, 51; Franz-Lothar Altmann, "Ex-Yugoslavia's Neighbours: Who Wants What?" The World Today, 48 no.8-9 (1992), 163-165.

effectively controlled the federal structures.[10]

MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS

Slovenia, considered to be the only republic to succeed in creating a democratic civil society, began its reforms in the mid-eighties. This resulted in "large-scale 'political security' operations" conducted by the federal army's counter-intelligence service.[11] Slovenia was the first republic to hold multiparty elections in April 1990, and in September, the Slovenian parliament accepted several constitutional amendments. The Federal Presidency attempted to devalue the amendments and declared them counter to Yugoslavia's 'constitutional system and integrity'. In October, Slovenia annulled 27 federal laws and called for a vote on independence. The Yugoslav military police occupied the Slovenian Territorial Defence building upon orders from the State Presidency and remained there despite outcries from the Slovenian Presidency.[12] Meanwhile, Slovenia managed to send its first representative abroad, reaffirming its goal of independence from Yugoslavia, to Austria with the opening of the 'Slovenian Cultural and Information Centre' in Vienna.[13] The Slovenian National Assembly (the Slovenian parliament)

---

[10] Tomaz Mastnak, "And Is No More" East European Reporter, Jan/Feb 1992: 4.

[11] Ibid., 3.

[12] Report on Eastern Europe, 19 Oct 1990, 52.

[13] Report on Eastern Europe, 31 Oct 1990, 40.

imposed a tariff on goods coming from other Yugoslav republics and abroad in reaction to Serbia's tariff on Slovenian and Croatian goods.[14] This effectively ended free access to all six Yugoslav republics' markets. The federal government declared Slovenian and Serbian internal tariffs illegal and their actions unconstitutional in response to this in an unsuccessful attempt to quiet the rising tensions between Serbia and the two other republics.[15]

Croatia held multiparty elections in May of 1990 in which the Croatian Democratic Party defeated the traditional Socialist Party of Yugoslavia and various others. The first evidence of the extent of tensions between Serbs and Croats was when Croatia's Serbian minority and Croatian police clashed in September 1990, during a protest by 2,000 Serbs (against the seizure of weapons that Serbs had taken from police reserve depots).[16] In October, Croatia's Serbs declared autonomy based on a (Serbian sponsored) referendum in which 99% of Serbs who voted supported autonomy. The (predominantly Serb) federal Presidency demanded that Serbs being 'unjustly detained' were to be released and that the Croatian police were to withdraw from towns with large Serbian populations. Serbs were ordered to return those weapons

---

[14] Report on Eastern Europe, 11 Nov 1990, 36.

[15] Report on Eastern Europe, 11 Nov 1990, 51.

[16] Report on Eastern Europe, 12 Oct 1990, 51.

illegally seized and to dismantle all barricades.[17] Nevertheless, heavy weapons were stolen in mid-October in Croatia from a train in the heavily Serbian-populated Knin. President Franjo Tudjman (of Croatia) insisted that Croatia was determined to fight if necessary to defend its territory against any moves the federal government might take to stop the progress to sovereignty. A proposal putting Croatia's leadership in charge of the republic's territorial defense system was approved in October.[18]

In response to the calls for independence made during this time by both Slovenia and Croatia, the federal government stated that any changes to any of the republics' laws would be deemed unconstitutional. As well, the federal Presidency threatened that any attempts at forming a republican army would be stopped. The presidents of Croatia and Slovenia met in October to discuss the federal Presidency's statements and drafted an unofficial joint declaration of sovereignty. They also made public their proposal for a confederal Yugoslavia which suggested restructuring Yugoslavia into an alliance of sovereign states.[19]

Bosnia-Herzegovina held multiparty elections on November 18. The three national ethnic parties came out ahead of the multi-ethnic 'reformed' Bosnian Communists and the Alliance of

---

17 Report on Eastern Europe, 12 Oct 1990, 51-52.

18 Report on Eastern Europe, 5 Nov 1990, 44.

19 Ibid.

Reform Forces. The Muslim Party for Democratic Action [PDA] won in three out of seven districts; the Serbian Democratic Party [SDP] in two; and the Croatian Democratic Community [CDC] in one.[20] Alija Izetbegovic (president of the PDA) had stated that a coalition could be set up with any Yugoslav party that was 'democratic' and recognized the integrity of Bosnia. A split occurred in November within the PDA between Izetbegovic's conservatives and Alid Zulfikarpasic followers (founder of the Bosnian Democratic Party [BDP]). Negotiations to form the new government in Bosnia began in late November between the PDA, Serbian Democratic Party and the Croatian Democratic Community.

The December 1990 multiparty elections in Serbia were won by Milosevic, the head of the Socialist Party of Serbia (formerly Communist), based on a nationalist platform calling for a 'Greater Serbia' and the protection of Serbs everywhere.[21] Under the banner of a 'united Yugoslavia', Milosevic engaged in a campaign of misinformation, oppression of dissent, and constitutional changes that limited the rights of the republics (especially for the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina).

Reaction against the communist past and the opportunism of prominent political figures shaped the newly formed democracies along nationalist lines. Democratic institutions

---

[20] Report on Eastern Europe, 14 Dec, 1990, 44.

[21] Report on Eastern Europe, 11 Jan, 1991, 45.

were modelled after a majoritarian (British type) democracy that appears to be totally inappropriate for a multi-national society, rather than proportional representation, which would have given political representation to the minorities in each state. In Serbia in 1990, the Serbian Socialist Party won 78 per cent of the seats with only 46 per cent of the vote while in Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union won 67.5 per cent of the seats with only 42 per cent of the vote. Furthermore, both Croatia and Serbia gave immense constitutional power to their nationalist presidents who are responsible for their actions only to the people who directly elected them and not to the Parliament.[22] Thus, the new democracies did not enter a process of decentralization that would allow genuine democratic developments. Instead through constitutional and electoral means the political system became a tool for suppressing minorities.[23]

THE SERBO-CROATIAN CONFLICT

Talks between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, began in January 1991

---

[22] This system did not come into effect without opposition, however. In 1990, when the Serbian government initially undertook constitutional amendments (which included multiparty elections), the opposition parties in the federal Assembly protested the electoral laws (East European Reporter, 12 Oct, 1990, 52).

[23] The Serbian constitution denies autonomy to Albanians in Kosovo where 90 per cent of the population is Albanian. This discussion is based on Vladimir Goati's article "Nationalism and the Democratic Deficit", found in Breakdown: War and Reconstruction in Yugoslavia.

but it soon was clear that neither side was willing to compromise. Croatia had proposed a Nonaggression Pact in February 1991 which would be signed by the eight Yugoslav constituencies and would override the constitution, and Slovenia had proposed "agreed dissociation" rather than unilateral secession in course of discussions. Neither proposal was acceptable to all however, and Tudjman and Kucan (the President of Slovenia) concluded after several sessions of talks with the Yugoslav government, that declarations of independence would be the only path open for Slovenia and Croatia.[24]

Such a conclusion, however, was not made in haste. The State Presidency set up Round Table talks to attempt a peaceful resolution to the constitutional crisis December 1990.[25] The debates centred upon Yugoslavia's constitutional future and whether Yugoslavia should be a confederation or a federation. The 'independence-minded' republics, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, wanted a confederal Yugoslavia where each republic had autonomy of government and independence while maintaining ties to the other republics. Serbia, the Army, and the Federal Presidency on the other hand, were more in favour of a federation and refused to

---

[24] It is important to note however, that throughout the entire crisis both republics had attempted to offer compromises to the Serbs and were willing to limit this independence in favour of more decentralized government. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

[25] Report on Eastern Europe, 14 Dec, 1990, 44.

accept any other alternative. The 'vehement nationalism'[26] of Serbia's Milosevic, Serbia's attempts at manipulating the parliamentary sessions, and the reactions of Slovenia and Croatia to these provocative actions, hindered any possibility of peaceful resolution and compromise.[27]

Another complication of the crisis were the actions of the (predominantly Serb) Army. It had stronger ties to the old communist system and attempted to 'strong arm' the republics wanting independence into adopting a federalist stance in favour of unity by threatening repressive actions.[28] Even as the Round Table Talks failed to bring about an agreement, the Army wanted to declare a state of emergency in order to enter Croatia and 'take control' of the situation. Clearly the army and the government were no longer units of one actor but had become two forces, as the army

---

[26] The clear path that Milosevic had chosen was one that would end in the establishment of a 'Greater Serbia'. This drive of Milosevic's has survived sanctions that are devastating the republic (S. P. Kramer, "Western Europe's 'Eastern Question'" The World Today, Dec 1991, 213; Pettifer, 1992; and others).

[27] Kramer, 1991; The State Presidency Round Table Talks held from December 1990 to January 1991 brought about no compromise, but did establish bilateral talks that continued throughout the growing tensions in Croatia.

[28] In November 1990, for example, former leaders of the once ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia held a founding meeting of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia-Movement for Yugoslavia; the party was set up by current and former military officers, former federal state presidents, and the Bosnian and Montenegrin Leagues of Communists. As well, later on in the conflict the army stated openly that it would continue to uphold the principles of a socialist Yugoslavia.

"found itself its own master", with neither a civilian nor a legal body controlling it. While the army remained standing, amid the ruins of federal Yugoslavia, it did not play a stabilizing role, but began to tolerate and aid the formation of Serb paramilitary groups both in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.[29] Amidst building fears in Croatia of a military crackdown and tensions between the Croats and Serbs, a split occurred within the army in March of 1991 between those who supported a state of emergency in order to get the situation 'under control' and those who opposed the army getting involved at all.[30] The army's actions as well as Serbia's refusal to discuss alternatives to federation had sealed the fate of Yugoslavian unity.

Croatia's and Slovenia's leaders in an attempt to reach a peaceful resolution proposed a Nonaggression Pact to be signed by eight Yugoslav constituencies, a treaty which would take precedence over the constitutional system. As well, they repeated their proposal that Yugoslavia be established as a confederal rather than a federal system, where the six republics would undertake "agreed dissociation" rather than unilateral secession. All proposals were either blocked by

---

[29] The army, motivated to maintain its status and power, found its role in Milosevic's plans to build a 'Greater Serbia' and became an important ally (Mastnak, 1992: 5).

[30] As indicated earlier, what was left of the body once known as the Yugoslav People's Army, had been supporting paramilitary Serbs in Croatia as early as September 1991 (Mastnak, 1992: 5).

the Serbian/Montenegrin majority or were labelled 'unconstitutional' by the federal government.[31] The republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia supported confederation but threatened complete separation if the federal government continued to insist on a federal system.

The Yugoslav government ordered the army and police into Slovenia to regain control over international borders that the Slovenian Police had taken in June of 1991. Armed conflict ensued between the Slovenian Territorial Defence forces and the Yugoslav Army. On July 7, 1991, the Brioni Islands declaration was agreed to by all republics, the federal government and federal presidency, guaranteed by the EC, and it involved a moratorium on any decisions concerning Slovenian and Croatian independence so that an agreement could be worked out in peace on Yugoslavia's future.[32] Slovenian youths were to be exempted from being drafted into the Yugoslav army. This helped ease tensions between Slovenia and Serbia. Perhaps that, and Slovenia's geographical location prevented the conflict from increasing within Slovenian borders.

Croatian leaders' responses to Serbian/Yugoslav calls for unity were naturally more aggressive than those of Slovenia's;

---

[31] Milosevic responded to Tudjman's presentation of the proposal for a voluntary confederation of Yugoslav autonomous states by stating that "...Serbia would not accept the breakup of the federation unless border changes were to bring all Serbs under one state" (Milan Andrejevich, "Croatia and Slovenia Propose Separation of Yugoslav Republics" Report on Eastern Europe, 15 March 1991: 28).

[32] East European Reporter, Jan-Feb, 1992, 4.

even though both had declared that their peoples were prepared to fight for autonomy, Croatia's relations with Croatian Serbs seemed to exacerbate Croatian-Serbian conflict. The build-up of tensions specifically between the Croatian Serbs and the Croatian police, led to violent clashes in 1991. Open fighting began between Croatian Serbs and Croatian police and guardsmen in July 1991. This fighting continued on heavily despite several attempts at ceasefires throughout August and September. In September the federal air force attacked Zagreb.[33] Serbs had begun arming themselves in fear of repressive Croatian measures against the 'opposition' to independence. Guns were again stolen from federal trains as they passed through predominantly Serbian-populated areas of Croatia, and roads surrounding Serbian 'enclaves' were barricaded against the police, buildings (such as the police station in Pakrac) were taken over and armed clashes flared up between police and Serbian 'paramilitary' groups.[34]

The deepening of tensions between ethnic Serbs and Croats was evident at the highest level of negotiations when Croatian and Serb representatives failed to move further on the March 25 agreement to continue talks toward a peaceful resolution of the ethnic fighting. The point of contention was the existence of armed groups--either the Croatian police units

---

[33] East European Reporter, Jan-Feb 1992, 5.

[34] "Weekly Report", Report on Eastern Europe, Jan 4-Mar 15, 1990.

which were acting as Croatia's army, or the paramilitary groups and Serb irregulars, fighting on behalf of ethnic Serbs in Croatia.[35] Both the federal government and army demanded that all groups disarm; and that any decisions could be made without the fear or threat of armed conflict breaking out. Croatia's leaders understood this to mean the Serb irregulars and not the police units. The consequent refusal to disarm the police brought down the army in protection of ethnic Serbs and rumours spread throughout the Serbian side that the Croats were going to massacre large numbers of ethnic Serbs residing in Croatia, a successful tactic, since it re-awakened memories of Croat atrocities against Serbs during the Second World War. Whether the rumours were true or not, they did not help, and ethnic Serbs continued arming themselves. The relations between Serbia and Croatia worsened.[36] Croatia's refusal to disarm its police force under orders from the federal government led to heightened ethnic tensions in February 1991 during the "Knin Syndrome" when Serbs blocked roads, took over 'enclaves', controlled traffic and declared autonomy from

---

[35] "The unwillingness of the Yugoslav army in particular to implement the very ceasefires it had negotiated has stalemated the EC-sponsored peace conference, despite the fact that Washington and Moscow [were at the time] both backing European efforts" (Kramer, 1991: 213).

[36] A propaganda film produced by Yugoslav secret police, had been shown in Yugoslavia, excluding Croatia, by Belgrade Television, claiming to prove that Croatia was planning to 'massacre' army personnel (Report on Eastern Europe, 8 Feb 1991, 43; Milan Andrejevich, "The Yugoslav Crisis: No Solution in Sight" Report on Eastern Europe, 22 Feb 1991, 38.).

Croatia, and again in March 1991 during the events at Pakrac, involving confrontations between ethnic Serbs and Croatian police units when the Serbs took over the police station. The federal Army stepped in, in March, ordering the Croatian units to disarm and leave. Some units did, but the confusion that reigned for several weeks hindered a resolution to the crisis more so than the existence of armed Croatian police units. Krajina Serbs at this time, announced their independence from Croatia and their desire to become a component part of (Serbian-dominated) Yugoslavia.[37]

As of December 1992, a Serb-Croat truce had been in effect for one year, and 14,000 UN troops had been stationed in Knin, Croatia, without incident. In January 1993, however, renewed fighting broke out between Croats and Serbs, who "still illegally occupy hundreds of square kilometres [sic]"; Croats were attempting to retake territory seized by Serbs, and fighting continues.[38] The effect of this on the outlook for successful peace negotiations in Bosnia-Herzegovina is extremely negative, as will be discussed later.

THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Many actors, including the EC and its member-states, Austria, and the US, continued to assert that only a unified

---

[37] The Krajina Serbs had set up their own government and military units in preparation for (not necessarily welcome) union with Serbia since April 1991 (Report on Eastern Europe, 10 May 1991).

[38] Newsweek 8 Feb 1993, 33; Time, 22 Feb 1993, 25.

Yugoslavia would be considered in trade and other relations during the initial stages of Croatia's and Slovenia's calls for recognition. Although financial aid was cut by the US and the EC to Serbia and Montenegro as an incentive for the prevention of the outbreak of civil war, the crisis was not seen as severe enough to warrant sending in mediators. On the eve of Slovenia and Croatia's independence day, June 25, the EC was still interested in a united Yugoslavia, as was most of the international community, and had stated that it would only deal with a united Yugoslavia in the future.

On the other hand, several international actors and states (the US and the EC) sent warnings to the Yugoslav government that violence to solve internal problems would not be tolerated (leading to sanctions and cutting of trade ties). As early as September 1991, Germany had begun threatening to recognize Croatia and Slovenia to ease the possibility of a crackdown on the two republics.[39] On December 23, Germany announced that it had officially recognized the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia.[40] The Yugoslav government attempted to preserve the cooperation between government and army through talks but the army continued to take an independent stance in the situation. A state of emergency was declared by Croatia in July 1991.

---

[39] Times (London), 26 Aug 1991, 10a; 8 Nov 1991, 11e; 13 Nov 1991, 13h.

[40] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest January 1992: 38703.

The EC appointed Lord Carrington in September 1991, who organized the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, to negotiate a ceasefire.[41] The EC Foreign Ministers felt Serbian leaders were responsible for the ongoing fighting between Serb irregulars and Croatian police, and was understood to be supporting the actions of Serb irregulars. Sanctions were imposed against Serbia alone by the EC, the US, Japan, and other states in the hope that the added burden to an already desperate economic situation would motivate the Serbs to end the fighting. In September 1991 the UN Security Council approved an arms and military supply embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. As well, the EC, realizing that ways of strengthening the ceasefire monitoring operation had to be found, met with representatives of the Western European Union [WEU], breaking ground in the relationship between the EC and the WEU so that the WEU could, for the first time, be considered as 'the military arm of the EC'.[42] It is important to point out here that divisions among member-states began to appear concerning two issues related to EC initiatives in the development of peacekeeping operations--military intervention and authorization of forces. The support for military intervention was strongest from France

---

[41] The Peace Conference on Yugoslavia began on 7 September 1991 ("Countdown: A Chronology of Yugoslavia's Final Months" East European Reporter, Jan-Feb 1992, 5).

[42] Trevor Salmon, "Tests for European Cooperation, 1990-1992" International Affairs 68, no.2 (1992): 233-253.

and Italy; Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany supported intervention, while Greece and Spain were cautiously supportive and Britain opposed any form of intervention. Divisions on the second issue concerned whether the UN and/or the CSCE would authorize the peacekeeping forces (France was more supportive of a UN mandate than was Germany).[43]

Despite the boycott of the federal presidency, an incomplete presidency made up of Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina) and Montenegro, calling themselves the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], continued to function without recognition from the four breakaway republics, the EC and much of the international community from October 1991 onward. The seige of Dubrovnik began in October and lasted until early December. Ceasefire after ceasefire had been negotiated and broken; army leaders and Serbs had openly declared that no ceasefire would necessarily mean that they would stop fighting; and the EC finally had to call upon the UN to help mediate a lasting ceasefire so that preparation for peacekeeping forces could commence and delivery of humanitarian and relief aid could begin.[44]

In order to begin ceasefire mediation, Cyrus Vance, UN

---

[43] Germany's role in the push for military intervention was unique, for while Germany supported military intervention, the German constitution did not allow for German troops to get involved in Yugoslavia--"German policy seems to have been influenced by public opinion, which felt that some effort had to be made to stop the killing" albeit without the contribution of German troops (Salmon, 1992: 251).

[44] Times (London), Oct - Nov 1991.

Personal Envoy for Yugoslavia, was appointed and the Geneva Conference was held in October 1991. It succeeded in setting up a ceasefire agreement between the warring parties. The UN peacekeeping operation was established, with the endorsement and support of the EC, but the fighting resumed. Unless all parties could agree to adhere to the Geneva agreement, the peacekeeping operations, it was determined, could not continue. Nevertheless, the UN approved the sending in of an advance group to make preparations for implementing the plan. Hopes were high as Vance held a meeting in Sarajevo between representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the Yugoslav People's Army, at which both signed the Implementation Accord (January 2, 1992) stipulating an unconditional ceasefire.[45]

The EC and member-states officially recognized Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992, along with 18 other countries including the Vatican--showing its support to Catholic Slovenes and Croats. Diplomatic relations were established by Germany and Austria on January 17; Bulgaria along with recognizing Croatia and Slovenia recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.[46]

---

[45] Peacekeeping and International Relations, May/June, 1992: 5.

[46] A convention on Yugoslavia, involving 159 groups, requested the 'rump government' of Yugoslavia to work out a procedure for secession. It refused and continued insisting on Yugoslavia with present borders intact (Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest January 1992: 38703).

The United Nations Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] were established with a 12-month mandate beginning in February 1992 in which 14,000 troops were to be dispatched to the troubled Croatia.[47] Peace talks on Bosnia had begun on February 13, 1992, and the first round had resulted in an agreement to maintain the existing external borders with powers devolved to the various ethnic groups residing within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The representatives of the ethnic groups included Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Muslim community, as well as representatives from the Croatian Democratic Community and the Serbian Democratic Party. Bosnia-Herzegovina officially declared independence in March and received recognition from the international community including the US and the EC.

It seemed that the unconditional ceasefire stipulated in the Implementation Accord would last, but by April 1992, fighting had erupted in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, between Muslims, Serbs and Croats.[48] The incident that had begun at Krajina had become an opportunity for the Krajina Serbs to move their 'military presence' across the border (and in doing so, effectively 'destroyed the border' between Croatian Serbs and Bosnian Serbs) into Bosnia-Herzegovina.[49] Croats had

---

[47] Peacekeeping and International Relations, May/June, 1992: 5.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Serb militia had felt that by moving from Krajina of Croatia into Bosnia-Herzegovina it had joined the two largely Serb populated areas of Croatia and Bosnia--it was claimed that these were 'military exercises' meant to 'test combat

attempted to block the Army's movement into Bosnia but were unsuccessful.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: THE CRISIS SPREADS

On 1 March 1992, in the referendum on Bosnia-Herzegovina's future, 62.68% (out of a 64% voter turnout) voted in support of independence.[50] Misha Glenny (1992) argues that the decision to hold a referendum on Bosnian independence was a result of the decision by the European Community to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. Bosnians and their president, Alija Izetbegovic had little choice but to accept Serbian dominance or to push for independence (which local Croats supported as well).[51] The absence of agreement among Serbs, Croats and Muslims ended what Glenny calls 'one of the great miracles of the twentieth century'--that is, fighting had been avoided in Bosnia-Herzegovina because of the knowledge that given the composition of the population there, any outbreak of violence would be impossible to contain.

The referendums that were held in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, made it clear that the choice of the people was independence. However, this choice

---

readiness' (Report on Eastern Europe, 21 June 1991, 41; Mastnak, 1992: 5, described these moves as the 'subversion' of the Croatian state).

[50] "Descent into War: Bosnia Since the Referendum" East European Reporter, May/June 1992, 4-9.

[51] Misha Glenny, "The Third Balkan War" in Breakdown: War and Restructuring in Yugoslavia (U.K.: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1992), 5-6.

was shaped in reaction to growing Serbian ethnic nationalism and fear of domination by Serbia. It was presumably preventative for Bosnians and Macedonians after it had become clear that the delicate balance of power in Yugoslavia among the different ethnic groups had been irreversibly damaged. Operating under the assumption of support from the international community, the different groups held referendums to increase their international support. However, political support for democratic procedures did not translate into tangible security measures that guaranteed the integrity of the new republics. In the face of Serbian military superiority and a slow, non-military international response, the independent republics paid an immense price for their independence. The referendums--while they increased the republics' legitimacy in world opinion--were of little help when Serbian, and later, Serbo-Croatian aggression in Bosnia took place.

The Presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (headed by Milan Panic[52]) urged UN peacekeeping forces to be sent in to prevent civil war in Bosnia, but the UN Security Council felt that ethnic tensions were running too high and

---

[52] Panic, on becoming Prime Minister in July 1992 (New York Times, July 15, 1992: A6), had advocated cooperation and negotiation with peacekeeping forces and respect for independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Due to his pro-Western stance on resolving the war and pro-Milosevic forces in the parliament he was voted out in the elections of December 1992 (Ivan Torov, "100 Days of Panic" East European Reporter, Nov-Dec 1992, 3-7).

any peacekeeping forces would be in great jeopardy if sent in. In May 1992, EC Monitors were evacuated from Sarajevo (where UN and EC operations working in Croatia had temporary headquarters while waiting for the fighting in Croatia to die down) along with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], and the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] due to indiscriminate fighting. Demands were made that fighting in Bosnia and Sarajevo end, that Yugoslav and Croatian troops withdraw, and that irregular forces disband and demilitarize. The fighting continued and still continues.

With the refusal of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia, along with Macedonia to participate in any federal government talks, Serbia (including the annexed provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina) and Montenegro agreed to form a 'rump Yugoslavia' under the new title the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April of 1992.[53] The international community refused to recognize its existence in light of the Serbian constitutional coup and control over 'Yugoslavian' political structures, and the unwillingness of the breakaway republics--Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Macedonia--to be considered part of a 'Federal Yugoslavia'. Attempts of the FRY to continue on in the place of the old Yugoslavia in organizations such as the CSCE, the UN, etc., were not accepted due in part to the

---

[53] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest June 1992: 38970.

above and to Serbian communities jeopardizing the efforts of UNPROFOR in Croatia by refusing to disarm, and in Bosnia by forming their own government and armed forces.

Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were accepted as members of the UN in May of 1992. At the London Conference on Yugoslavia, the French proposed a package that included humanitarian aid, collaboration with UN actions to separate the warring parties, and reinforced diplomatic efforts, which was accepted by the EC Foreign Ministers.[54] As well, talks under three EC-sponsored forums--the EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, the Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Arbitration Commission--in place since late 1991 continued.

The EC suspended its ECMM (EC Monitor Mission) after one of its members was killed in Bosnia, and the EC declared that "by far the greatest share of the blame falls on the JNA and the authorities in Belgrade which are in control of the army, both directly and indirectly by supporting Serbian irregulars".[55] Throughout May the fighting in Sarajevo intensified despite several short-lived ceasefires and threats of sanctions. Negotiations continued between the three ethnic communities (EC-sponsored), but would break off each time a ceasefire was broken. As well 'secret meetings' backed by the Presidents of Croatia and Serbia were held to discuss

---

[54] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest April 1992.

[55] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest May 1992: 38918.

partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia.[56]

An EC trade embargo was imposed on May 27, freezing export credits and blocking scientific cooperation. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the FRY including: severing trade links; freezing government assets abroad; an oil embargo; a sporting and cultural ban; and cutting air links.[57]

A WIDENING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE EFFORTS

International activities were centred on stepping up efforts to get humanitarian aid and relief to heavily besieged areas in Bosnia. While the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time remained the internationally recognized official Presidency, it had lost control of most of the territory it had originally when Bosnia declared independence in April 1992, and this territory was being blocked from any aid efforts; the situation had become desperate. There were many barriers to the international community's attempts to garner support, in terms of both political and material commitments. The EC, as we have seen, had difficulty in getting all member-states to agree on the specifics of sending peacekeeping

---

[56] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest May 1992, "Discussions on Possible Partition": 38919.

[57] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest May 1992: 38918.

troops and even in offering recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina.[58] The UN, while unsuccessfully mediating ceasefire after ceasefire, was trapped between the (obviously independent) agendas of militia forces on the ground, and the desires of the representatives in the negotiations to bring an end to the conflict without jeopardizing nationalist goals.

The following outlines the increased activities of the international community toward the second half of 1992. International efforts to peacefully end the conflict now centred on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many attempts were made in order to get humanitarian aid to Sarajevo (under seige since April 1992). A state of war was officially declared in June by the Bosnian Presidency. UN-sponsored talks had resulted in an agreement that Serb forces would cede control of the airport to UN control, but a UN convoy from Belgrade was attacked en route to opening the airport. Situations such as this, where higher level negotiations have resulted in agreement between the parties and the UN but the ground forces supporting them respond differently (as though the negotiations had never taken place), plagued peace efforts throughout 1992 and into 1993. Short-lived ceasefires were declared from June 15 to the 21st. Lord Carrington's efforts (at the EC Conference on Yugoslavia) failed to restart

---

[58] At the height of fighting in Bosnia, a US-proposed resolution for the UN Security Council to condemn the detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina, harking back to the 1949 Geneva Convention obligations, was adopted (Peacekeeping and International Relations, May/June 1992, 5).

negotiations after separate talks with the Croatian and Serbian Presidents and the Bosnian Foreign Minister.

The Vance-Owen Plan to divide Bosnia into 10 semi-autonomous provinces, ethnically-based, supported by the EC and the UN, needs only to be agreed upon by the three warring parties--Croats, Serbs and Muslims--in order to take effect.[59] It was first proposed in late 1992, the last of a number of similar proposals for the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines to prevent worsening of the civil war. By February 1993 this plan had the support of Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. It is not certain however, if the plan will survive the determination of Bosnian Serbs ('Serbian parliament' and people) to include Serb 'liberated' territory (such as the 'corridor' running from Krajina to the Adriatic coast).[60] On the other side, Bosnia's official President, Alija Izetbegovic, believes the cantonization of Bosnia rewards Serbian aggression. International support for the plan is wavering, for it is doubtful that either Serbs or Croats would be willing to withdraw from the land both now occupy.[61] The United States' reaction initially was negative, but the Clinton Administration has now agreed to support it with humanitarian

---

[59] Time, 18 Jan 1993, 23; 1 Feb 1992, 31; 22 Feb 1993, 24-25; Newsweek, 8 Feb 1993, 36.

[60] Time, 25 Jan 1993, 26-27.

[61] Serbs occupy 70 per cent of Bosnia at present, while Croats occupy 20 per cent (Time, 1 Feb 1993, 31).

relief.[62]

In the name of Bosnian Muslims, the Islamic Conference Organization [ICO], involving Islamic nations (including Turkey, Egypt, Iran and others), held forums in June and August for discussion of the situation in Bosnia. At the June conference, the Bosnian Foreign Minister called for military intervention and the severing of diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia. At the same time, Turkey and Egypt expressed readiness to participate in a UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia.[63]

The first follow-up meeting of the CSCE since signing the Paris Accord (in November 1990), held in June 1992, resulted in a new accord aimed at preventing, managing and settling conflicts peacefully "by transforming the CSCE into an effective body capable of preventing wars and promoting political stability across the European continent".[64] Despite the discussions, no concrete mechanisms emerged that would enhance the ability of the CSCE to intervene more forcefully in the Yugoslavian conflict. The CSCE suspended the membership of the rump Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, an action that under the circumstances was merely

---

[62] Newsweek, 8 Feb 1993, 32-33; 15 Feb 1993, 35.

[63] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest June 1992: 38970.

[64] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest July 1992: 39030.

symbolic.[65]

NATO Foreign Ministers in military coordination with the WEU, agreed to authorize a NATO maritime operation to monitor Yugoslavia's compliance with UN Security Council resolutions.[66] The WEU and NATO furthered their cooperation when the WEU put at the immediate disposal of the UN almost 5,000 troops along with transport and logistical equipment. The Human Rights Commission of the UN held a session to examine the events in Yugoslavia, namely 'ethnic cleansing'. The UNPROFOR mandate was expected to be extended to include the reporting on, stopping of and assisting of the victims of human rights abuses throughout Bosnia. The UN Security Council also approved a resolution which authorized 'all measures necessary' to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. A resolution stated that the International Committee of the Red Cross should have unimpeded access to detention camps throughout former Yugoslavia.[67] France offered 1,100 troops to support the above resolution and Spain, Italy and Belgium also intended to send troops. The US opposed the use of

---

[65] As well, plans were made to send 'exploratory' missions to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina to investigate allegations of human rights abuses against Albanian, Muslim and Hungarian minorities in these areas (Ibid.).

[66] As well, further international cooperation involved the UN, NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE in discussions on the practicalities and appropriate scale of any international military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ibid.).

[67] The detention camps of the Serbs were by far the more numerous, but on all sides detention camps were considered to be equally squalid and abusive to prisoners.

ground troops and the UK changed its stance and announced that it would place 1,800 soldiers at the UN's disposal.[68]

London sponsored a Conference of representatives of 20 countries, including leaders of the six former republics of Yugoslavia, representatives of the EC, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the CSCE and other governments and concerned parties. The conference, the largest gathering since the beginning of the crisis, represented a widening of the peace process to include the CSCE, countries neighbouring the region and Muslim countries.

The response of the international community was obviously something too little, too late to stop the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. International aid initially could not make it into Bosnia, and when it did it accelerated Serbian attacks on Muslim communities (especially U.S. food drops). Humanitarian aid was seen as delaying the 'clearance' of Muslim strongholds, and many Muslims were killed in their attempts to get the supplies. The ceasefires that were mediated were all broken, exposing the complexity and unsolvable nature of the conflict after it began. Nevertheless, as Cedric Thornberry, Assistant Secretary to the Mission UNPROFOR, has pointed out, negotiation and relief efforts have slowed if not stopped the

---

[68] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest August 1992: 39035.

loss of lives.[69] It was expected that without these measures not thousands, but millions of lives would have been lost. It is not premature therefore, to say that without peacekeeping activities, mediation, and the attention of the international community, the catastrophe could have reached Pol Pot proportions. Even if one assumed honest intentions on the part of the negotiators, it becomes clear that the implementation of any agreement was not solely in the hands of any one party, since all political leaders denied responsibility for the armed militias, stating that they were 'defending' themselves. However, it is sound to attribute more responsibility to the Serbian side, Serbs being the main aggressors and militarily superior (the fragmented Army having joined with the Serb 'cause'), and in a better position to secure the ceasefires. Also, the atrocities committed by Serbs in detention camps and the systematic rape of Muslim (and many other) women by Serb soldiers and irregulars were seen by many in the Western press as intentional measures, aimed at the physical and spiritual extermination of the 'Enemy'. The Croatian side is responsible for similar atrocities, only on a smaller scale. The true victims appear to be the Muslims, who, lacking military power and being, culturally at least, the most distinct, have endured the worst.

---

[69] Mr. Thornberry took part in an interview conducted on *CBC Prime Time News*, Sunday, April 18, 1993.

The international response despite its limited effects, has been the largest and most intrusive peace effort exercised by non-Balkan international actors. Some states demonstrated readiness to participate in one way or another in the peacemaking process. Commitment of troops to the UN, sponsoring and participating in peace conferences, providing aid, expertise, etc.. International institutions such as NATO, the WEU and the CSCE, as will be discussed later, coordinated their activities and established new conventions for their future cooperation. It is not certain if this cooperation between international actors, states and institutions will evolve further. It is even more uncertain if the presumed evolution will take place in time to avoid the proliferation of the conflict to other Balkan actors.

SOUTHWARD EXPANSION OF THE CONFLICT

The potential of Serbian aggression to spread to the (formerly autonomous) province of Kosovo and further south into Macedonia represents the fuse of the Balkan 'powder keg'. A Balkan war could potentially involve Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey if Serbian aggression expands to Kosovo and Macedonia. The discussion that follows will begin with the situation in Kosovo and the plight of ethnic Albanians there. It will continue with an account of the Macedonian Question and the conflicts it has sparked as well as the concerns of minorities living in Macedonia, followed by the views of other Balkan states directly concerned about the 'Macedonian question'--

Greece, Albania and Bulgaria.

In Kosovo, 90% of the population is Albanian. Since 1990, upon losing their autonomous status, they have been under the jurisdiction of Serbia and have endured repressive martial law. Kosovo is considered by Serbs to be an important historical and cultural centre, but the Albanians there want independence from the Serb-dominated 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'. Ethnic Albanians living in Serbia have experienced discrimination from the Serbs and want their minority rights to be recognized.

As a result of the present conflict, Albanians fear a crackdown and many have fled to neighbouring Macedonia, Greece and Italy to escape the continually deteriorating conditions, both economic and political, in Kosovo. As well, the Albanians have been amassing arms in preparation for this crackdown. Kosovo is a key point for the start or prevention of an all-out Balkan war. The United States has threatened intervention if Serbian aggression moves south. However, it is not certain that these warnings are enough to deter the Serbs, especially if U.S. inaction hitherto is interpreted as a pattern that will continue. Serbian aggression is not the only way in which the crisis can expand. Albania has been supportive of Kosovo's independence, hoping to annex the well-developed area once independent, and to resettle its citizens to the south pushing out ethnic Greeks who also have been pressuring the Albanian government for the extension of

minority status and rights.[70] Serb aggression aside, if Kosovo's Albanians decide to revolt, not only will the fighting embroil Albania and Serbia, but potentially Greece would have to move in to protect the ethnic Greeks, and Turkey is expected to come to the aid of fellow Muslims, thus, further exploiting the decades-old antagonism between the two Balkan states.[71]

Macedonia is also an area threatened by the expansion of Serbian aggression. As of December 1992, there have been approximately 761 peacekeeping troops, military advisors and civilian police stationed in Macedonia, under UN sponsorship.[72] This particular UN action has a symbolic significance since it indicates growing UN assertiveness. Never before has the UN supported an operation, such as this, not agreed upon by both parties. It is also indicative of extending its principles to include protection of minorities where internationally recognized borders are not involved. These actions, aiming to deter an upcoming conflict, signify the emergence of preventive diplomacy by the UN.

MACEDONIAN NATIONALISM: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY

Macedonia being the southern-most province of former

---

[70] Nicholas Gage, (Special to the Washington Post) "Kosovo a Political Powder-keg" The Edmonton Journal, 18 April 1993, A8.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest December 1992: 39240.

Yugoslavia, shares its borders with Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. The fears of old territorial conflicts being resurrected have been exacerbated by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization's [IMRO] assertion that Macedonia extends beyond the present-day borders of the former Yugoslav republic into Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, and that it should be made whole again.

Historically the population in Macedonia was part of struggling peoples that were attempting to liberate themselves from the Ottoman empire. In 1893, the Vardar Macedonian Revolutionary Organization [VMRO] was created with the intention of uniting the people in the area against the Turks. In Sofia, an organization calling itself the External Macedonian Organization was set up to encourage the annexation of Macedonia into Greater Bulgaria. The influx of Macedonian refugees into Sofia gave support to the argument that the VMRO constituted a political movement and not an ethnic movement. Up to the present day, the Bulgarian state insists that Macedonians are 'ethnic Bulgarians' and the conflict between the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization [IMRO] and the Bulgarian state continues. The operation of both organizations, the VMRO and the EMO, and other armed groups in the region, created confusion in the population. Nevertheless, the VMRO was able to consolidate its position as a revolutionary force. In its attempts to overthrow the Turkish rule, the VMRO also appealed to the Turkish people in

the region since the revolution was against an oppressive regime and not the Turkish people as such. It is important to note that contrary to the other liberation movements in the region--Greek, Serb, Bulgarian--the VMRO did not organize on the basis of ethnicity at the time. All people in the region were rallied as Macedonians united by their oppression. Given the mixed composition of the peoples and the fact that the VMRO was defeated by the Turks, the Macedonian cause of the VMRO did not materialize. Furthermore, the great powers at the time showed little interest in supporting 'Macedonia for Macedonians' as envisaged by the VMRO. During and after Ottoman occupation, the territory of Macedonia was always being contested by the different ethnic groups in the region. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire left a vacuum that all Balkan nation states attempted to fill.

From the 1870s Greece and Bulgaria were attempting the assimilation of populations inhabiting the area. A four-year war between the two countries started in 1904. By 1910, a new territorial order had been established that has not changed since, despite the numerous challenges that it encountered.[73] Between 1913 and 1925 major population changes took place in the region that were aimed toward the creation of homogeneous nation-states. Exchanges took place between Turkey and Greece, and Greece and Bulgaria. Greece and Bulgaria

---

[73] Stavros Ligeros, Skopia: To 'Agkathi' tis Balkanikis (Athens: A. A. Livani and Sia E. E., 1992).

contributed to the homogenization of the nations in the region and to the emergence of a new and relatively lasting status quo. In Greek Macedonia, more than 90% of the population were linguistically and culturally Greek, while Slavic Macedonia was overwhelmingly Slavic.[74] There was never a distinct ethnicity known as Macedonian, since the ethnic groups that were populating the region in the 19th century had their own names. In the area now proclaimed as the Macedonian nation, foreign office papers list the following populations before 1912: 1,150,000 Slavs; 400,000 Turks; 300,000 Greeks; 200,000 Vlachs; 120,000 Albanians; 100,000 Jews; and, 10,000 Gypsies.[75] A 1981 Yugoslav census--the most reliable data according to Pettifer before the politicisation diminished the reliability of information coming from the former Yugoslavia--gives data indicating that there are: 1,912,257 people from which 1,281,195 were listed as Macedonians; 377,726 Albanians; 86,691 Turks; 47,223 Gypsies; 44,613 Serbs; 39,555 Pomaks; 7,190 Vlachs; and, 1,984 are Bulgarians, plus a small number of people from six other ethnic groups.[76]

There are definite changes in the composition of the populations between the two censuses. Jews disappeared after the Nazi occupation, Greeks are also non-existent and most

---

[74] Ligeros, 1992.

[75] James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question" International Affairs, 68 (1992): 175-183.

[76] Pettifer, 1992.

importantly, the million or so Slavs have been named Macedonian together with whoever decided to join the new ethnicity. The transformation of Macedonia from a geographical to an ethnic entity that exists within the three states (Bulgaria, Greece and Vardar Macedonia) is not only offensive to neighbouring states but historically incorrect. No theorist of nationalism to my knowledge has acknowledged the existence of a Macedonian ethnic group, other than that of the nationalist movement IMRO. According to Smith, the IMRO is one of a few good examples where nationalism emerged as a movement characterized by conspiracy, terrorism, reprisals against collaborators, nihilism and totalitarianism.[77] Plenty of evidence exists that the IMRO's survival within the Communist state of Yugoslavia was due to its nationalist stance. The 45 years of Communist rule not only failed to eliminate the myth of a Macedonian ethnicity, but fostered the institutionalization and safe creation of the ethnic myth. As within the Communist state of Yugoslavia, the Slavic character of the population could not be mentioned as an ethnic category because being 'Macedonian' was accompanied by tangible benefits from the Yugoslavian political structure.

It is not certain that the IMRO-DPMNU (the present-day Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) can be considered

---

[77] Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism 2nd ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1983), 14.

representative of the population in Macedonia. As with the Serbian and Croatian constitutions, the Macedonian constitution was made with the intention of denying appropriate representation of minorities, and adopting 'majority democracy' or 'first-past-the-post' democracy and not proportional representation that would be more appropriate for giving a political representation to the minorities in Macedonia. Albanians are the primary supporters of the Party for Democratic Prosperity that is addressing precisely the question of political representation of minorities in Macedonia.[78] As theorists of nationalism have pointed out, newly-formed states frequently replicate nationalist problems on a smaller scale. New minorities are in turn created, and their rights are denied in the process of constructing a national identity.[79] Thus, the IMRO is on the one hand, a nationalist force that accommodates the emergence of the new nation-state, while on the other hand, its nationalist character becomes the obstacle for recognition. Its re-emergence as a movement brought forward a number of issues that were not in the forefront of politics hitherto. Having always encountered the possibility of assimilation by Bulgaria, Greece or Serbia, the IMRO has been a nationalist movement. The intensity and inflexibility of the IMRO's

---

[78] Vladimir Goati, "Nationalism and the Democratic Deficit" in Breakdown: War and Restructuring in Yugoslavia (U.K.: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1992), 15-16.

[79] Smith, 1983.

ideology and practice can be seen as reactions to its very shaky ethnic base and to the present possibility of Serbian aggression. The movement historically has depended on the institutionalization of its propaganda and its assimilative and repressive policies toward 'non-Macedonian' peoples.

In many ways the movement became a victim of its history in the post-Cold War era. Rather than attempting a tactful emergence on the political scene, the IMRO launched an assault of nationalist propaganda and a constitution that included territorial claims against Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia which has limited its chances of quick recognition.

As 'Macedonian' nationalism gains momentum, the response of other ethnic groups residing in Macedonia (such as the Albanians and Turks) are being heard. The constitution of Macedonia no longer describes the republic as a Macedonian nation with Albanian and Turkish minorities, but simply as "the state of the Macedonian nation", further exacerbating ethnic group relations between Albanians, Turks and those calling themselves 'Macedonians'.[80] Estimates of the Albanian minority population in Macedonia range from 20-27% (according to Macedonians), to approximately 40% (according to Albanians).[81] Albanians have experienced incidents of

---

[80] Andrejevich, 1991c: 27.

[81] This figure has been estimated to be as high as 40% by leaders of the Albanian minority there; the high birth rate as well as the influx of refugees has brought the numbers up drastically so that Albanians make up approximately half the population of Skopje (Milan Andrejevich, "Resurgent

discrimination in Macedonia as well, where the use and teaching of the Albanian language is restricted, Albanian political leaders undergo political trials, and elected Albanian leaders are not recognized. Albanians boycotted a 1991 census because they claim that the number of Albanian census-takers was not proportional to the Albanian population.[82] As a result, the census declares that only 15% of the population can be considered ethnic Albanian.

The authenticity of claims to a Macedonian ethnicity have therefore been questioned by Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and by ethnic Albanians living within Macedonia.[83] In Bulgaria, Macedonians are considered to be 'ethnic Bulgarians' of Bulgarian descent, speaking a Bulgarian dialect.[84] Serbs consider Macedonians to be 'slavic Serbs'. Greece denies the existence of a Macedonian minority in its borders. Greece also considers the appropriation of the Macedonian identity by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization [IMRO] an insult to the Greek nationality. Slavic people appeared in the geographical area known as Ancient Macedonia, around 700 A.D., while the integration of the Macedonian and Hellenic

---

Nationalism in Macedonia: A Challenge to Pluralism" Report on Eastern Europe, 17 May 1991, 27).

[82] Ibid.

[83] Altmann, 1992: 163.

[84] One historian during a videotaped interview, even went as far to say that perhaps they are 'purer Bulgarian' than Bulgarians.

cultures took place under Alexander the Great, a thousand years prior.[85] This gave rise to what is known as the Hellenistic period where the two cultures shared a common language and later became integrated. For Greeks, publics and government, the Greek heritage of the Macedonian culture is undeniable.

As theorists of nationalism have repeatedly pointed out, it takes enough people to feel part of a nation for a nation to exist. However, the falsification of history for the purposes of nation-building could only be irrelevant if such a process were not antithetical to the existence of another nation. This threat--like most nationalist threats--is both real and imagined. The more real manifestations of the threat are seen in the aggressive and highly undiplomatic manner in which the new nation proclaimed its existence and its aspirations. Territorial aspiration in the new constitution towards Greece, the immediate claims for a Macedonian minority, the circulation of maps showing the area of the new Macedonian state--including an area populated by 2 million Greeks--were actions that touched an historic nerve. As Pettifer (1992) points out, Greek history and culture are characterized by a pre-occupation with a Northern threat, a threat that has been real--and not imagined for centuries. Turks, Germans, Italians, and Bulgarians have all invaded

---

[85] Albert M. Craig, et al. The Heritage of World Civilizations (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 130-149.

Greece from the North.

Relations between Macedonia and Greece are tense as a result.[86] In 1991, Macedonian vehicles were turned back at the Greek border and hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Salonika protested against the republic's use of the name Macedonia. Prime Minister Mitsotakis had earlier agreed to the addition of a prefix to the title, but changed his position in April 1992 stating that Greece would only recognize an independent Macedonian state under a completely different name--erasing any implications of territoriality.[87] Many have claimed that Greek fears are unfounded and that the new Macedonian nation is too weak to pose a threat--after all, Greece is both a member of NATO and the EC. Greeks however, see it differently. When politics of distrust predominate in the Balkans, countries operate on the basis of a worst-case scenario. It is not the Macedonian state that Greeks are concerned with but the possibility of a northern coalition

---

[86] Now, Greece has been accused of placing an oil embargo against Macedonia potentially devastating its economy, while violating EC sanctions against Serbia by sending oil there (Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest October 1992: 39150).

[87] Ironically, he took this position following the firing of Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras in April 1992 over taking an 'independent line' on Macedonian recognition--i.e. to close the borders between Greece and Macedonia if the EC recognized 'Macedonia'. (Helena Smith, "Greece Fires Minister over Macedonia" The Guardian, 14 April 1992, 8; and, "Macedonian Crisis for Greek PM" The Guardian, 17 April 1992, 10).

against Greece.[88] The historical experience with shifting coalitions in the Balkans is still fresh, and Turkey's and Bulgaria's immediate recognition of Macedonia was seen as an indication of Turkey's attempts to create pressure from the North.[89] Also the claims in Greece for a Macedonian minority were perceived as an attempt to strengthen Turkey's legitimacy on the international scene especially concerning minority claims. (Turkey has complained about the treatment of the Turkish minority in Greece). Greece's objections to Macedonian sovereignty have resulted in EC-initiated talks establishing the criteria under which Macedonia will be recognized (by the EC). The criteria include renouncing any territorial claims on any country, including interference in domestic affairs (i.e. concerning 'Macedonian' minorities residing in other countries).[90] As well, it must use a name other than 'Macedonia' to alleviate fears of territorial

---

[88] The Greek newspaper To Vima tis Kiriakis, reports the direct danger of the Turkish army moving into the Balkans, if allowed to do so by Bulgaria and Macedonia under the 'pretense' of helping Muslim populations in the region. This particular scenario has been prevalent in debates on all levels ("I Tourkia stelnei strato yia epemvasi sta Balkania" 22 November 1992, 1).

[89] Bulgaria has stated it may be willing to come to the aid of its 'brothers' in case of the spread of war to Macedonia, and has already stated it is willing to recognize a Macedonian state. This has raised Greeks fears of its neighbour to the north. However, Bulgaria's interest in an independent Macedonia is based on fears of Serbian hegemony in the region and the untrustworthiness of Serbia's Milosevic.

[90] Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest January 1992: 38704.

claims.

Talks between EC Foreign Ministers, Macedonian Foreign Minister Denko Malevski and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis throughout 1992 failed to resolve disagreements over the criteria of recognizing Macedonia's independence.[91]

Although there is a commitment on the part of the EC and most states in the international community to grant recognition to the 'Macedonian' state, there is also an awareness that premature recognition--a recognition that fails to address the Greek and Albanian concerns--might result in further polarization and instability rather than in the normalization of relations. Although there are supranational incentives from the EC to solve the 'Macedonian' question, the supranational actor is confronting the nationalist obstacle that is composed of both the legitimate concerns of the nation-states involved and of ethnocentric, distrustful power politics triggered by the process of constructing a national identity in the 'Macedonian' state. As time progresses, nationalist sentiment limits the ability of leaders to propose or accept reasonable solutions.

From the Second World War onward, Greece did little to counter the emergence or the creation of the 'Socialist Republic of Macedonia', fearing accusations of involvement in

---

[91] The EC sponsored talks in February, May and June of 1992, and to date there is no agreement. At the EC Lisbon Summit the EC reiterated its readiness to recognize Macedonia under a different name, but representatives from Macedonia refused to compromise.

the domestic affairs of Yugoslavia. Although it repeatedly rejected that there is a Macedonian issue it did not engage in clarifying its position in international organizations concerning the implications of the use of the name Macedonia and of claims for a Macedonian ethnicity.[92]

One might see this as shortsightedness on the part of the Greek government. According to Ligeros, even after the death of Tito, when the possibilities for the disintegration of Yugoslavia were becoming real, the Greek government ignored the issue. Only after later developments did the Greek government engage in a serious diplomatic confrontation with the Skopje government. It seems very probable that the Greek government did not expect the intensity and anti-Greek sentiment of the newly-forming state, and were operating under the assumption that given the importance for Greece of the new nation's economy, and given Greece's advantageous status as an EC member, the new state would be influenced by and 'friendly' to Greek concerns. One can only speculate as to what would have happened if the emergence of the Macedonian issue in Greek politics had not happened in a context of accusations and counter-accusations. The initial reaction of the Greek press to the 'Macedonian' Constitution and territorial claims, left very little space, if any, for defining the issue in a friendlier light. As Ligeros points out at the end of his book, one of Greece's two options initially was to welcome the

---

[92] Ligeros, 1992: 38.

'Macedonianess' of the new state and to emphasize a common interest in the cooperation of two peoples that have cultural and historical bonds; however, after this option had been exhausted through the actions of both states, their relations continued on the path of further polarization and inflexibility.

Despite Greece's objections to the recognition of the 'Macedonian' state, the politics of the Mitsotakis government remained safely within the 'acceptable' behaviour of international conduct. The willingness of the Greek government to grant a de-facto recognition, placed the ball in the court of the EC and the UN, and purposely or accidentally (depending on one's point of view) delayed the recognition of the new state. The Greek government also did not engage in polemics about the minority rights of non-existent Greeks in 'Macedonia' and did not follow the pattern initiated by the Skopje government that claimed the rights of a non-existent 'Macedonian' minority in Greece.

The behaviour of the Greek government reflects the pacifying effects that the emerging Western order has on Balkan states not immediately involved in the war. The Greek government refused a (secret) Serbian proposal to divide 'Macedonia' between the two states. The Greek government reported the incident to the EC to the surprise of the Serbs, who had enjoyed tacit support from the Greek government hitherto. This support officially ended December, 1992, when

the Greek government, faced with the international condemnation of Serbian atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, openly criticized Serbian aggression and attributed most of the responsibility to Serbia for the continuation of the conflict. Although these developments may appear unimportant at first glance, they are indicative of serious changes on the Balkan scene. In previous eras the military vacuum presented by 'Macedonia' would have inevitably triggered the partition of the area by neighbouring states (namely Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia and Greece). However, territorial advances seem little gain for Greece and Bulgaria who are focusing on development, a secure diplomatic status in the international arena, and for Greece, the advantages of EC membership. It is becoming apparent that economic considerations are high on the agenda, holding in check acts of provocation and aggression that have characterized Greek-Turkish relations.

The international recognition of 'Macedonia' and the normalization of relations with Greece is fundamental for the reversal of the southward movement of the Balkan crisis. Assuming such a recognition, one can envisage a positive scenario where relations between the two countries are normalized, and where EC assistance and international involvements result in enhancing both security and economic development for the new country. However, a recognition of the new nation state under the name 'Macedonia' is not inconsequential. Positive and negative scenarios can easily

be constructed, but it is important to account for some developments that seem certain before proceeding with those that are not easily predictable.

A safe prediction is that the area will experience a rising wave of nationalist sentiment in both Macedonia and Greece. While the Macedonians will enter a stronger phase of nationalist propaganda, proclaiming national victory, Greeks will experience a re-awakening of their old fears of invasion from the north and of an unsupportive international community that conspired against them. In such an environment, it is not certain that cooler heads will prevail. Despite the present Mitsotakis government's attentiveness to EC mediation attempts and concerns, it is not certain that this government will survive to grant such an acceptance in light of the growing power of the PASOK party [Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party], which has capitalized on a nationalistic agenda. Whoever stays in power will do so by accepting a nationalist agenda of defiance to such an international resolution.

The struggle between nationalism and supranationalism is nowhere more observable than in Greek politics. Political elites and publics are aware that EC membership is both a strategic and economic advantage for Greece that should not be endangered by defiance of EC objectives. However, the conflict over Cyprus with Turkey, the latest escalation of animosities in the Aegean that almost brought the two countries into war and the knowledge of the military and

numerical superiority of Turkey are too real to allow Euro-optimism to prevail.[93] Turkey's rush to recognize 'Macedonia' and its guarantees of Macedonian security, as well as its warning Greece against involvement in the war in former Yugoslavia, were seen as 'proof' of the historical goals of Turkey to dominate the Balkans and to create an anti-Greek alliance in the North.

GREEK FOREIGN POLICY

The Macedonian crisis cannot be attributed to the actions of the IMRO and the nationalism of 'Macedonians' alone. Greek foreign policy has been, at least in the initial stages, highly inconsistent and has contributed greatly to the nationalist turn of the two countries. The political polarization of Greek society that has resulted from the vicious competition between PASOK and the New Democracy Party [ND], as well as Greece's sensitive position of being simultaneously a Balkan state with serious security problems, and an EC member-state with supranational objectives and ties, were the two initial main reasons for a conflictual foreign policy. The polarization of relations between Greece and 'Macedonia', the spreading of the war in former Yugoslavia, the overall worsening of the Balkan crisis, and especially the perceived and real threat of Turkey, resulted in an enormous rise in nationalist sentiment that in turn has restricted the manouvrability of Greek foreign policy.

---

[93] Nelson, 1991.

To break the impasse, Mitsotakis proceeded by firing Samaras, his foreign minister, who had taken an extreme nationalist position, defying EC mediation efforts and the diplomatic process in which Mitsotakis was involved. He stated through his new minister, Ioannis Tzanis, that Greece will grant a de-facto recognition to 'Macedonia', i.e., after the European Community and the United Nations grant it recognition. This move, as Ligeros points out, gave Mitsotakis a breathing space, since both the EC and the U.S. postponed the recognition of 'Macedonia' under the condition that Greece engage in bilateral negotiations with the 'Macedonians'. However, the popular reaction surpassed Mitsotakis' wildest expectations. Samaras became the most popular person in Greece and the EC began losing in the opinion polls.[94] A boycott of Italian and Dutch products to protest their support for 'Macedonia' had astonishing success, and the Prime Minister encountered the most serious political dilemma of his life: to proceed to political suicide by supporting a de-facto recognition, or to take a stronger nationalist position and risk Greece's international

---

[94] Pettifer points out that EC insensitivity to the issue has cost EC popularity in Greece and accordingly,

> *[i]n the immediate future, the most important developments affecting Macedonia are likely to be in Greece, as the government there attempts to find some compromise between European pressures and domestic viewpoints....the EC has on this issue often seemed deeply insensitive to the legitimate concerns of people about their cultural identity, to the detriment of the EC's political influence* (Pettifer, 1992: 183.)

isolation. Consistent with his previous political life, Mitsotakis chose the route of political survival, reversed his moderate position and adopted a more nationalist tone.

Under immense domestic pressure, Mitsotakis rejected a proposal made by the Portuguese leadership--the so-called Pinheiro package. This proposal could have put Greece in an extremely advantageous position over the emerging Macedonian state. In short, the Portuguese initiative proposed:

a) that the Constitution of the new state would be changed to eliminate sections that imply territorial claims on Greece;

b) the parliament would officially declare that there is no 'Macedonian' minority in Greece;

c) Greece would supervise[95] the economic relations of the new Macedonia with the EC and it would have guarantees for the movement of Greek goods to and from the Community;

d) guarantees from the US and the EC of the inviolability of their respective borders;

e) the name 'Macedonia' will be accompanied by an adjective, for example it would be called New Macedonia or Slavic Macedonia, etc.

This proposal was, in effect, what the Greek government under Mitsotakis had previously accepted. However, the reaction of the press and the public to the mention of the name 'Macedonia' remaining was enormous and confirmed the

---

[95] This aspect of the proposal is indicative of a transfer of supranational influence to a member-state.

'suspicions' that Mitsotakis would back off under international pressure and betray Greek vital interests.

The reluctance of the European Community to grant recognition to Macedonia has mistakenly been attributed to Greece's objections alone. After all, the Albanian minority is more than a detail in the process. The IMRO and Albania have not reached a common position about the fate of the Albanian minority. Many feared that without resolving this problem, the new state will experience a break-up before it is formed--a development that would expose the shortsightedness of those pushing for a quick recognition. As Coakley (1992) points out,

> *Policy makers are also acutely conscious of the fact that as a solution to ethnic unrest the creation of a new state normally leads to a reproduction of the same problem in microcosm: a minority has become the majority, but new minorities have been created.*[96]

As a result of the aforementioned questions, the Macedonian issue remains open. However, we have witnessed both the direct (mediation, incentives) and, as will be discussed in the following chapter, indirect (supranational) influence of the EC that is manifested in the willingness of states to join the EC and restructure accordingly. We have also witnessed the extension of UN activities from peacekeeping to peace-making and the containment of nationalist conflict in that

---

[96] John Coakley, "The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology" International Political Science Review, 13, no.4 (1992): 355.

area. This expansion of institutional activities and the EC's supranational influence are trends that in the author's view will be permanent and evolving features of the Balkan scene. Indications exist that the recognition of Macedonia by the international community is a matter of time. It seems probable that a compromise will be reached which will address Greek and Albanian concerns to one extent or another. One can hope that a compromise will be reached soon since unresolved, the Macedonian question will remain as one of the most explosive issues in the Balkans.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I attempted to show the magnitude of the Balkan Crisis. The brief references to Balkan history at the beginning of the chapter juxtaposed with a relatively detailed account of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, and the response of the international community, provided, in my view, both a sense of historical continuity and of the unique contemporary dimensions of this crisis.

As in the past, instability in the Balkans of today has coincided with great structural transformations in the international environment.[97] The collapse of communism and the emergence of a multi-polar capitalist democratic system encouraged movements for self-determination and the consequent

---

[97] As Cohen (1992) explains, ethnic and religious violence in the Balkans has appeared during regime crisis and breakdown ("The Disintegration of Yugoslavia" Current History, 91, no.568 (Nov): 369-375).

nationalisms that were instrumental in triggering the crisis.

Balkan states and ethnic groups aspiring to nationhood are encountering both positive and negative developments. On the one hand, democratization, integration with Western political and economic institutions and economic development seem to be within reach, while on the other, territorial and ethnic differences threaten the prospects for peace. In this light, the strengthening of democracy in most Balkan states and the increasing ties that these countries are developing with the international community should not be seen as minor developments. The growing influence of international institutions and supranational actors is increasingly being felt, providing the opportunity for regional-institutional developments in the future. It is also safe to say that the strengthening of political democracy in the region is greatly accommodated, normatively and institutionally, in the emerging Western order.

In the Balkan context, rising nationalisms remain a threat to democracy and peace. It should be noted however, that this is a lesser threat for countries with some experience in political democracy (such as Greece and to a lesser extent Turkey) and which, historically, have been politically and economically linked to the democratic capitalist order. Both countries--Turkey and Greece--have not engaged in any military mobilizations, but have been active on the diplomatic front. Their governments and publics, while

highly attentive and nervous about the Balkan crisis, do not appear ready for any adventurism. It is the war in the former Yugoslavia that presents the greatest challenge to the emerging Western order. Despite the efforts, the responses of the international community appeared to be too little, too late in stopping the war. This however, should not be understood as a pattern that will necessarily re-emerge in the future. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the new Western order is experiencing serious institutional restructuring, aimed precisely at developing political and military mechanisms capable of confronting a Yugoslavian-type crisis in the future. It will be argued that the new international order, while incapable of halting the break-out of ethnic aggression and hostilities in the Balkans (and Eastern Europe), is experiencing an institutional, socio-economic[98] and normative transformation that constitutes a serious multiple challenge to the influences of nationalism, ethnic territorial aggression, totalitarianism and political isolationism. This new order appears more collectively interventionist, and one can hope, that potentially will have a stabilizing effect even in civil wars (probably the most complex form of conflict).

---

[98] Here, I refer to the supranational developments of Western Europe and the incentives provided by the EC to countries in the periphery for strengthening their democratic institutions and practices.

# CHAPTER TWO:

# International Actors and the Balkan Crisis in the Post-Cold War Order

The post-Cold War and post-Gulf war era have opened up new possibilities for the future of international organizations like the United Nations, the European Community and the NATO alliance. The end of the Cold War has limited or perhaps eliminated the perennial "veto" problem in the United Nations; the Gulf war has established new conventions and expectations about the role and power of the United Nations and has raised hopes for international cooperation for the resolution of international crises.[99]

The Balkan crisis[100] is threatening the future of European integration and is a challenge to the EC and the UN. It is also an opportunity for the U.S. to re-examine its role in the European scene. While at times the agendas of all seem to converge in their approaches to the crisis, most of the time there are obvious clashes of agendas that contribute to an inconsistent international response to the crisis. It is important to explore and expose the "visions" held by these

---

[99] Andrew Hurrell, "Collective Security and International Order Revisited" International Relations, (1992).

[100] The war in former Yugoslavia is the major manifestation of this crisis. However, it is the posturing and positioning of states in the immediate periphery--their readiness to be involved militarily, to secure their national interests and that of their minorities in other states--that gives the crisis a regional dimension.

powerful international actors and to highlight the conflicting interests that are responsible for the present state of international mediation and interference in the Balkan crisis. These conflicting interests have been partly responsible for the failure of international institutions and states to date to stop the conflict. However, it is equally important to highlight the degree of co-operation and agreement that exists internationally, and to account for the way in which almost consensual condemnations of aggression, humanitarian aid, mediation activities, monitoring missions, and peacekeeping activities have at times contained and at others limited the intensity and expansion of the crisis.

WESTERN EUROPE, THE EC AND THE BALKANS

First, I would like to examine the implications of the present instability in the Balkans for the process of political and economic integration in the European Community [EC], and through such an analysis, identify the EC's interests in the resolution of the Balkan crisis.

One immediately becomes aware of a number of theoretical and methodological problems. The EC escapes a precise definition as an international actor with respect to the crisis. The European Community appears at times as a cohesive actor with common interests while at other times the states that comprise the Community seem to follow independent courses toward the resolution of the crisis. Member-states maintain considerable political power that at times makes the EC appear

as simply a council of nation-states. However, the supranational objectives of the European Community are simultaneously the objectives of each member-state which has decided to pursue the goal of European economic and political integration. Although the different states do not share the same vision of a united Europe, they have all committed themselves to a process of economic, political and social transformation that has a supranational orientation. This common commitment and the development of the institutional apparatuses of the European Community are stable and evolving features of the new Europe.

The EC is a supranational entity that has an immense effect on the evolution of the Balkan crisis and is an important actor in determining the shape of the post-Cold War order. This influence does not stem solely from the political decisions taken in Brussels (although those are not considered unimportant either). Rather, it stems from an historical process of economic and political restructuring that is transforming the role of nation-states in Western Europe, limiting their sovereignty and engaging them in processes of domestic restructuring that aims towards economic, political, social and cultural homogenization of Europe. This process has also been responsible for changing the broader international scene. The European Community and its immense economic and possibly political clout, is motivating states in close proximity to the Community to enter into friendly

relations with the EC and to attempt serious restructuring with the prospect for future membership. These states operate under the effect of what I will call the 'supranational influence'.

As will be seen in this chapter, in the Balkans, this influence has not overwhelmed other considerations, especially considerations of state security and minority rights. Moreover, in accepting the EC as an influential entity, one should not ignore the numerous ways in which nation-states have limited, or are capable of limiting, or reversing the influence of the supranational actor. Nation-states as they operate within and outside the Community at times challenge not only the institutional cohesiveness of the supranational actor, but seem to establish serious obstacles to its development. The rise of nationalist sentiment within Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Balkans appears at the moment to be a major threat to supranationalist Europe, exaggerating already existing problems of the Community associated with its institutional infancy and complexity and the diverse interests of the different nation-states. Thus, the fight between nationalism and supranationalism is seen as operating within and outside of the European Community, and the Balkan crisis appears for the moment to bring this tension to the forefront.

## EC INCENTIVES FOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKAN IMBROGLIO

The European Community has plenty of incentives for getting involved in the Balkan crisis. The Balkan crisis is

a serious threat to the interests of the EC in a peaceful periphery and a security threat to particular EC member-states. The successful resolution of this crisis, by Europeans alone, would have more than symbolic significance. since it would enhance European autonomy vis-a-vis the U.S..

EC institutions, having as their main agendas the development of a truly supranational entity, have stronger motives for involvement and resolution of the crisis than most member states on their own. Attempting to stabilize the periphery is a natural extension of main EC objectives. It is essential, therefore, to examine the EC's involvement in new security arrangements, its attempts to mediate the Balkan crisis, and its goal for political and economic integration as part of an inter-related process.

In an era of complex interdependence, any war in the periphery of Europe, especially in the Balkans, will inevitably disrupt the political and economic goals of the European Community. Not only might markets and the movements of goods be disrupted, but supranational goals for a grand area where democratic capitalism and free trade predominate will fail to materialize. Thus, the security of the periphery is simultaneously a desirable goal for all European states since the periphery can only be useful in this modern economic sense, and not be subject to (as in the past) imperialist control.[101] A stable periphery is a major pre-condition for

---

[101] Braun, 1983: 119.

the success of the EC experiment.[102]

Another factor that is equally important for achieving the EC goal of political and economic union is the need for consensus among political elites and publics concerning the identity of 'Europeanness'. The Balkan crisis appears to have a diverse ideological effect that at times contributes to strengthening a sense of 'Europeanness' that is based on the exclusion of and indifference toward non-Europeans, while at other times appears to divide the European publics along traditional lines. While the former effect can be seen in the relative indifference that Europeans have shown towards the plight of Bosnian Muslims, the latter can be seen in the way European governments and publics have shown their support for 'traditional allies' (German-Austrian support for Slovenian and Croatian independence; initial Franco-Greek support for Serbia).

In light of the process of economic, political and social integration of EC states, the Yugoslavian civil war appears as an anomaly, flying in the face of the new myth of a homogeneous Europe, damaging the common identity or the 'Europeanness' that was to become a force for unity and successful integration. The war in former Yugoslavia has re-awakened old loyalties among the European publics that date

---

[102] Nelson, in his book The Balkan Imbroglio (1991), states that conditions in the Balkans make difficult the transition to stable democratic societies and endangers the integration process.

back to the Second and even the First World War. Hitherto, theorists that have studied the European process have focused on the diverse economic and political interests that might endanger the integration process. However, the struggle between nationalism and supranationalism is not limited to policies concerning trade liberalization, free movement of capital and of labour. It also involves a battle for human minds. The supranational objectives of the EC cannot be met without the consent of the European publics. The numerous directives that the EC issues to member-states in domains hitherto belonging to the domestic sphere, still depend on the willingness and capacity of the different governments to adopt them. Aware of this reality, the EC has engaged in a process of identity definition that closely resembles that of nationalist movements. Hettne points out that the nation-building process is similar to the regional integration process, with the only difference being that no force has been used for the creation of the supranational state as it was for the nation-states.[103] Similarly, Pieterse argues that a myth-making process has resulted from the speculation about Europe after 1992.[104] The response to the heterogeneity of the European populations was the forging of the myth of a common European identity. This process is characterized by

---

[103] Bjorn Hettne, "Security and Peace in Post-Cold War Europe" Journal of Peace Research, 28, no.3 (1991): 279-294.

[104] Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Fictions of Europe" Race and Class, 32, no.3 (1991): 3-10.

its common definition of the 'European culture', based on Judeo-Christian religion, the Greek Hellenic ideas in the fields of government, philosophy and science, and the Roman ideas about law. This definition, Pieterse argues, ignores European regional cultures and sub-cultures, has an elitist (not popular) orientation, and is based on the exclusion of non-Europeans.[105] The media, the educational apparatuses, European and national institutions, are all participating in the construction of that myth in a manner that resembles closely the emergence of the nation-state in Europe. However, as mentioned before, the re-emergence of old alliances reinforces the sense of difference among Europeans and is an unwelcome development for those who wish for the emergence of a supranational European identity. Fears for the emergence of a new 'Teutonic Bloc' for example, are undermining the confidence of European publics in the supranational process.

Despite these differences however, on a different level the Balkan crisis appears to reinforce a sense of a common European identity. As nationalist ideologies were and are based on differentiation from, and exclusion of other peoples, the myth of a common European identity is characterized by similar tendencies. It is not certain if this process of constructing a European identity has played a part in the

---

[105] Christianity's Asian origin, the schisms of Christianity, the Reformation, the battle of reason against faith and the emergence of Naziism are all phenomena that are considered evidence of the 'myth' of a common European culture (Pieterse, 1992).

apparent indifference that European publics have shown for the plight of Bosnian Muslims. It has become apparent that although European publics are supportive of peacekeeping, mediation and international solutions, they have not shown equivalent support for Bosnian Muslims as was the case with Croats and Slovenes, despite their truly desperate position. Although the history of European nations does not appear as one of peaceful coexistence, a sense of Europeanness was always available when circumstances demanded it, especially in recent history. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire brought about by the joint efforts of European states is a historical reality of which the cultural effects can still be felt. Despite the genocide of Muslims by Serbs and sometimes Croats in Bosnia, the West continues to maintain an arms embargo against former Yugoslavia, which in practice limits Bosnian Muslims from defending themselves against militarily far superior Serb militias. Despite the countless mediation efforts by the EC, UN, and the CSCE, it appears that the fate of Bosnian Muslims is sealed. In the absence of public pressure from their populations, Western governments and international institutions appear ready only to accommodate mediation efforts, hold an ineffective arms embargo aimed at containing further expansion of the crisis, and threaten Serbia with further sanctions. In reality, this translates into a green light for Serbian aggression in Bosnia since it has become apparent that no outside intervention will

interrupt the genocide of Muslims. The West seems to share a view expressed by John S. Stedman (1993) that the Bosnian crisis can be solved by a political or military compromise between the warring factions, and not by any outside intervention. Stedman suggests that peace enforcement in the Balkans by the West should focus on serving international security, and not allow humanitarian considerations to result in a non-pragmatic international response. According to the author, action against Serbia should only be taken to deter aggression against Kosovo and Macedonia, to thus avoid a southern expansion of the crisis.

An outright Balkan war is highly threatening to the emerging Western order. Such a war, as mentioned earlier, could involve Bulgaria, Albania, Greece (both an EC and NATO member-state) and Turkey (a member of NATO), a possibility that has important implications not only for the aforementioned Balkan states, but for Europe as a whole. In recent years, Western Europe and particularly EC member-states, are confronting a serious immigration problem. In addition to immigrants from African countries, Eastern Europe and the Balkan crisis, are already adding new pressures. Refugees from the war in former Yugoslavia as well as economic refugees from Albania have become serious problems for Greece and Italy already.[106] An all-Balkan war would create similar

---

[106] At least 300,000 Albanian economic refugees have entered Greece within the last two years. While Greek and Italian governments have provided aid to the Albanian government to

if not more extensive problems for other European states such as France and Germany, which already have a serious immigration problem. The wish to avoid such a nightmare scenario triggering the involvement of European states and institutions.[107] For the EC an all-out Balkan war can endanger the supranational experiment. At a time when consensus is required for the completion of political and economic union, the Balkan crisis creates further divisions between member-states, and adds to the rising xenophobia, reflected in the re-emergence of the far-right on most European countries' political scenes.

The EC tested its capabilities in a mediating role in former Yugoslavia, a role that according to many was an attempt to establish itself as a regional hegemon capable of bringing peace to the region through incentives and negotiation. It was an attempt meant to erase the EC member-states' failure to appear truly united in the Gulf War and to enhance its autonomy vis-a-vis the U.S.. However, this attempt encountered internal and external problems that undermined both goals. Some evaluated this response as

---

stabilize the situation, the problem seems to be increasing. The political crackdown of Serbia against Kosovo, and the possibilities for Serbian aggression extending into Kosovo have resulted in more refugees.

[107] The population in the Balkans is more than half that of the European Community, and the avoidance of military conflict alone is not enough to secure the process of European integration. Instability in the area and chronic underdevelopment can produce a mass exodus to Europe (Nelson, 1991: 3).

premature, one that interfered with more capable UN mediators, who are more experienced and have more 'tools' at their disposal (i.e. peacekeeping forces, observers and monitors, etc).[108] Others[109] saw it as a test that the Community passed; one that signifies its new role and future potential. Whatever view one chooses, it is safe to observe that the Community's mediation has not achieved an end to the Yugoslavian war. The three instruments, according to Jacques Delors, the EC had at its disposal--namely, public opinion, economic sanctions, and the threat to recognize the breakaway republics--proved too little to reverse the push for a 'Greater Serbia'.[110] From these three instruments, only the last two could have had a direct influence, while the first one could only have been used to rally support for EC initiatives. In May 1991, the EC threatened not to negotiate the privileged association agreement with and to disrupt aid to Yugoslavia unless peaceful solutions were found for Yugoslavia's ethnic crisis. In June, the EC added weight to its previous threats demanding that the rotating presidency was to be restored.[111] From the 1980s, the EC and Yugoslavia

---

[108] Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Breakdown: War and Restructuring in Yugoslavia (UK: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1992).

[109] Rummel, 1992.

[110] Jacques Delors cited in Trevor Salmon, "Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: the Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992" International Affairs, 68, no.2 (1992): 248.

[111] Salmon, 1992.

had a preferential trade and cooperation agreement that had great importance for the Yugoslavian economy since 35 per cent of trade was with the EC countries.[112] Despite the hardships facing the Yugoslavian economy, the forces of nationalism, combined with the opportunism of political leaders, made ineffective a usually influential bargaining tool of the EC.

Up to this point, as Salmon indicates, the EC portrayed a high level of cooperation and agreement with member-states supporting the aforementioned measures.[113] However, the unity of EC member-states on the question of a peaceful Balkans was disrupted when other means to achieve the goal were negotiated. The differences that emerged were part of larger disagreements over the visions of European security in the post-Cold War era, and over spheres of influence which European states are attempting to establish in the Balkans.

The present instability in the Balkan region, as well as that in Eastern Europe, has brought forward the issue of European security in the post-Cold War order. Up to the present, security considerations were not high on the EC agenda because of a structured international environment where the divisions of power were well-defined and, to one extent or another, permanent. The emergence of the European Community as an economic and, later political, entity became possible by initial security considerations which required the integration

---

[112] Braun, 1983: 171.

[113] Salmon, 1992: 249.

of Western economies as a way of increasing the unity and cohesiveness of the Western Alliance. Free from security considerations, Europe engaged in the process of advancing Community goals of economic and later political integration. The relative successes that the Community had in the 1980s in advancing these goals were certainly accommodated by the existing security arrangements, the primary role of the U.S., and the avoidance of different security visions that could have endangered the unity of the Community or disagreements on security questions that could have spilled over into other areas.

The 1990s, on the other hand, are forcing a re-examination of present security arrangements in Western and Eastern Europe, a process that also has implications for the Balkan region. Despite the evident change in the international status quo resulting from the collapse of the Communist system, optimism for the future of European integration has continued to rise. The speed of the integration process and the increasing interest that many countries have shown in joining the EC, has resulted in a sense of inevitability about the success of the European process. An emerging sense of European power and influence was a key factor in triggering heavy involvement in the Balkan crisis. As it became clear this was based on a false or exaggerated sense of that influence.

Disagreements began between member-states over the issue

of military intervention and the relationship between the EC and the Western European Union [WEU]. In attempting to strengthen the EC's ceasefire monitoring operation, on September 19, 1991, the WEU effectively became the military arm of the EC. However, disagreements broke out over the number of troops to be sent, and the nature of the intervention that was to take place.[114]

The crisis exacerbated perennial problems facing the EC. The nationalist, at times ethnocentric, positions of many European states toward the crisis, divided the response of the Community at a time when the Community was attempting the strengthening of its status in the post-Cold War order. The competition between states was reflected in EC policy which at times appeared inconsistent--granting recognition to Slovenia and Croatia, which did not meet human rights criteria, while denying recognition to Macedonia, which had a much better record. Despite the inconsistencies in EC policy, the EC has played a major role both as an actor directly involved in the resolution of the crisis, and has provided the supranational context that has had a great influence on the larger Balkan scene.

The supranational commitments of all EC member-states pose numerous dilemmas for them since choices must constantly be made between the immediate political benefits of supporting a strong national agenda and the long-term benefits expected

---

[114] See Chapter One.

from supporting policies that transfer authority to supranational institutions, where the supranational goals precede that of the nation-state. Nowhere is this conflict more apparent than in questions of foreign policy, and in this respect all EC countries have been accused by their EC partners of subordinating EC goals. However, national interests as expressed through governments, are not necessarily the only challenge to supranationality. Nationalist sentiment appears to be a more potent force that rises above national and supranational interest. Repeatedly, European leaders have responded to the nationalist fears of their compatriots instead of proceeding with policies that reflect sound cost-benefit analysis between nationalist and supranationalist policies.

Critiquing German foreign policy, Horsley argues that a number of policies since 1989 including Germany's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, were not carefully thought out choices but resulted from the divisions of power in the German government.[115] Germany announced before the Maastricht Treaty that it would recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Ignoring the principle of "common action", championed hitherto by Germany in the EC, Germany proceeded with recognition of the republics before Christmas of 1991, and in the process ignored the Community's concerns about the protection of human rights

---

[115] William Horsley, "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins: A Critique of German Foreign Policy" Millennium: Journal of International Studies, no.2 (1992): 225-241.

and minorities. The EC had offered to recognize collectively the republics that met their human rights standards after January 15, 1992, and Chancellor Kohl announced the recognition as "a success for German and European policy".[116] As Horsley, points out, despite Germany's future as a diplomatic and commercial partner of Croatia, it is not certain that national self-interest was the main factor behind the recognition. This was not the first time post-Cold War Germany used assertively its political clout, endangering the long sought after confidence of other European states, and appearing inconsistent on a number of fronts, but it was the most dramatic demonstration hitherto. First, Germany assumed this 'leadership' role, declined any responsibility for the consequences, and granted recognition to the republics. Germany also supported sending peace-keeping forces, yet declined to participate due to constitutional and historical reasons; i.e. Germany's occupation of the Balkans during the Second World War. (The close collaboration of Croats with Nazi forces against the Serbs was not seen by Germany's government as part of the same past that could revive old antagonisms, but it has.) Second, Germany having in the past been accused of behaving in nationally assertive ways, added one more charge to its list in that it has lost considerable

---

[116] Horsley, 1992: 238.

credibility and trust within the EC.[117] As Horsley explains, the German population's identification with the Croatian cause was the strongest factor that pushed the government toward a 'popular' decision.

Whatever the reasons for Germany's decision, the action contributed to the delegitimation of the EC since its recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was seen as a result of German pressure and not as a sound decision aiming toward the stabilization of the situation. When on January 15, 1991, the EC accepted Croatian independence, the EC ignored the findings of its own commission that pointed out that Zagreb did not meet the minority rights criteria for recognition.[118] One cannot argue with certainty that the German-EC stance was solely responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia since the increasing polarization of the opposing sides in Yugoslavia was rapidly becoming insurmountable. However, this type of premature involvement certainly accelerated the disintegration process since the remaining republics lost any hope that a balance of political power could be found in Yugoslavia. Fearing Serbian domination, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

---

[117] Horsley lists 'Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins' as occasions where Germany has used unreasonable assertiveness which contradicted its main goals: The Polish Border Question; its role in the Gulf War; French-German plans for a European Army; participation in the EC in general; and, the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.

[118] Hugh Miall, "The EC's Confused Role" Breakdown: War and Reconstruction in Yugoslavia (UK: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1992), 59-62.

Macedonia and Kosovo all proceeded toward autonomy.

THE MAASTRICHT TREATY AND FRANCO-GERMAN COMPETITION

The Maastricht Treaty is a good illustration of the status of supranationality in Europe. The Treaty has attracted much attention and has been analyzed in all possible dimensions by many theorists. It made apparent the difficulties associated with the process of unification, and exposed the competing social projects (that of a social Europe versus a libertarian Europe) and competing national projects (competition between European states on economic, political and military fronts). This competition however, took place within the parameters provided by the EC context, and more specifically, by the Maastricht Treaty. As Vernet points out, the Maastricht Treaty proved much less ambitious, particularly concerning the speed and degree of unification, than the Mitterrand-Kohl initiative in April, 1990.[119] Both France and Germany compromised their visions to allow the continued progression of EC objectives.

In examining France's foreign policy it is apparent that a preoccupation with an independent foreign policy (originating with the exclusion of France from Yalta) continues to motivate French policy-makers at the end of the Cold War. The French seem more determined than ever to assert themselves internationally. Despite an obvious interest in

---

[119] Daniel Vernet, "The dilemma of French foreign policy" International Affairs, 68, no.4 (1992): 657.

reducing the role that NATO and the United States will occupy in the new Europe, French foreign policy appears to lack a coherent vision for the new Europe.

France enjoyed a 'special position' within the Cold War order; a position that according to Vernet (1992) has lost its significance. Being on the side of the victors against the Third Reich, a permanent member of the Security Council in the United Nations, and a military power possessing nuclear weapons are factors that have lost their significance in the post-Cold War era. France's political position is no longer a more advantageous one than Germany's, in a time where Germany's economic strength is increasingly felt. In light of this, the institutional redefinition of Europe on military, social and economic fronts has gained additional importance for France that attempts to secure its political and economic future by exerting its influence on international organizations.

At this time, France seems preoccupied with two goals: to counter-balance Germany within Europe, and to limit American involvement in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty is of great importance to France in advancing both objectives. Vernet argues:

> *For the French, Maastricht is the key word in this balancing act. Monetary union will end the Bundesbank's 'dictatorship' over interest rates and therefore over the economic policies of the other European states. True, these latter will never recover that element of their sovereignty, but they will at least be able to influence decision-making within the European central bank. Equally, the*

> *formulation of a common foreign and defence policy should make it possible to channel German might into an integrated progression. The creation of the Eurocorps (initially to be a Franco-German force, with a strength of 35,000 when it becomes operational in around 1995) also serves the purpose of tying Germany into a structure that is answerable to Europe, outside NATO and removed from any direct contact with the United States.*[120]

Mitterrand's view that self-determination of peoples should be accompanied by safeguards for individual rights and minorities, is one that has proven correct in former Yugoslavia where the absence of such checks has resulted in a bloodbath. Despite the insightful views, Mitterrand's proposals since 1987 reflect his preoccupation with enhancing France's autonomous position in Europe first and foremost; and dealing with European security last. In 1987, in light of the changes and in anticipation of rivalries, Mitterrand proposed a 'confederation', an institutional framework with the EC being its stable centre.[121] Mitterrand's 'confederation' was not attractive enough for Eastern Europeans, who were offered a package of indefinite exclusion from EC membership and a vision of European security that limited, if not eliminated, the role of the United States in Europe; a vision not shared by many countries in both Eastern and Western Europe.[122] According to Zelikow, France, being aware of its limited resource base, has transferred to the European union its

---

120 Vernet, 1992: 658.

121 Vernet, 1992: 660.

122 Vernet, 1992: 661.

European ambitions (economic, political, and military), despite the lack of interest from its European partners.[123]

Present trends indicate that in the post-Cold War order in Europe, the United States and NATO will continue to play a major role. Concerning France and its attempts to influence the institutional development of Europe towards a more integrated system, especially in the domain of security, some authors (Zelikow, 1992) have expressed the view that the present security dilemmas of Europe require more immediate solutions and more U.S. involvement than envisioned by France. The war in former Yugoslavia exposed the limited capacity of European institutions, the EC, CSCE and the WEU, that lack enforcement capacity and at present are limited to non-military measures.

> *Instead of arguing the virtues of isolationism, most Europeans reacted to the display of diplomatic impotence in the Gulf and Yugoslav crises by building new institutional castles in the sky, arguing that Europe would be stronger and more assertive if only it could agree on structures for a common European foreign and security policy.*[124]

EC member-states are not unaware of the limitations confronting the process of institution-building, but find the strengthening of institutions necessary for enhancing the stability of Europe. Each European state is aware that its position in the new world order depends greatly upon the

---

[123] Philip Zelikow, "The New Concert of Europe" Survival, 34, no.2 (1992): 12-30.

[124] Zelikow, 1992: 20.

direction that the institutional restructuring and redefinition will take. According to Rummel, 1991 "might well be called the year of institutional competition". During the Gulf crisis and the Yugoslavian Crisis, Europeans were discussing and planning the future of the institutional organization of Europe.

The French-German plan for a European Army is another example of evident tension caused by a hidden conflict between European powers and the U.S., as well as among European states themselves. Britain openly criticized Germany and France for secretive actions.[125] The French-German plan although consistent with the WEU's role, did not clarify its relationship to NATO.[126] This jurisdictional ambiguity is certainly not accidental, but part of an experimental strategy by France and Germany who, cautiously, are attempting to assert a more autonomous existence. These disagreements based on nations' perceptions of their 'national interests' are fought over at every perceivable opportunity in various ways. Thus, while the Eurocorps for example are seen by the Germans as a way of bringing the French closer to Atlantic military command, the French are using it to engage the Germans in an autonomous European defence framework.[127]

---

[125] The criticism came from British Chief of State Defence, Field Marshall Sir Richard Vincent in January, 1992.

[126] Horsley, 1992: 234

[127] Vernet, 1992: 661.

While some European states (France) prefer to minimize the role of the U.S. and NATO, others, like Britain, prefer U.S. leadership in the security of Europe. These differences can be seen both in the competition of states within international institutions and in their reactions to bilateral or multilateral agreements. France for example, resisted the idea of NATO becoming the CSCE's main military component, a development that the U.S. was pursuing. The conflict between France and the U.S. over the role of NATO and its relation to the CSCE was compromised. The CSCE is able to request NATO assistance on a case-by-case basis. It retains responsibility for the direction of operations and allows the possibility for non-NATO states to be involved in its operations.[128] For Ghebali, this compromise signifies a new start where joint action between the major international institutions will characterize the management of post-Communist Europe.

The different positions taken by European states (Germany, Britain, France) should not be seen as reflecting only their differences regarding the institutional development of Europe. Domestic considerations beyond nationalist affiliation also contributed to their positioning. Joffe points out that France and Britain followed 'an implicit pro-Serbian line' by opposing recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, because both countries are encountering their own problems

---

[128] Victor-Yves Ghebali, "The July CSCE Helsinki decisions--a step in the right direction" Nato Review, 40, no.4 (1992): 6.

with nationalities within their borders--the Corsicans and the Irish Republican Army [IRA] in Northern Ireland. It is apparent that given the similarities, any support that international organizations and states gave to the Yugoslavian ethnic groups could strengthen the secessionist movements at home and increase their international support. Germany and Austria, not facing domestic problems of that sort, were fast to call for the recognition of the breakaway republics, triggering accusations from the British and the French that a 'Teutonic Block' was in the making--in which Croatia and Slovenia returned under German influence as before the First World War under the Hapsburg Empire.[129]

So far our examination of the Western European scene points out the dynamism of the post-Cold War international environment. The EC has been a main actor redefining the relations between states in Western Europe and the periphery and one that is expanding its role from an economic organization to a political one.

To take the view that the Gulf war, the Maastricht Treaty or the Balkan Crisis are tests that the Community did or did not pass, is to miss the issue. The fact that the most ambitious goals of EC planners did not materialize in all these cases should have been expected; the Gulf War, the Maastricht treaty, and the European response to the Balkan

---

[129] Josef Joffe, "Collective security and the future of Europe: failed dreams and dead ends" Survival, Spring, (1992): 40.

crisis make evident that the European experiment has settled for less than initially expected in the domain of security and foreign policy.[130] It is also evident that the EC is emerging as an influential political entity capable of many independent initiatives; an entity that also gives many incentives to nation-states in Europe to conform with the conventions of the new democratic capitalist status quo. The involvement of the EC in the Balkan Crisis as mediator, arbitrator, and guarantor, makes it clear that the EC is expanding its role, entering domains that previously belonged to military organizations such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the foreign policy of states or the UN.

This 'opening' however, both in the Gulf War and in the Yugoslavian War, exposed the EC's limitations as an international actor. Motivated by a need to act consensually, the EC found itself incapable of dealing with a challenge of such magnitude as the Yugoslavian war. Not only did it lack the enforcement capabilities necessary, but it displayed a lack of cohesiveness as an actor. Whenever it appeared that a consensus was reached on any given issue, the EC would be confronted with an objection from one or another member-state. For instance, when, in the beginning of the crisis it seemed more important to maintain ties with a united Yugoslavia and the EC was not willing to recognize any republic's claims to

---

[130] Almost every theorist examined in this work commented on the Gulf War as being the test for a common foreign policy that the Community has not passed.

independence, Germany raised objections. Later on, when the break up was becoming inevitable and the EC was willing to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, France raised objections as well as Greece. When it was becoming clear that the European member-states should contribute peacekeeping forces to help the UN in the conflict in Croatia, Britain objected to sending in ground troops. When the EC was ready to grant official recognition to Macedonia, Greece raised objections. All the aforementioned objections raised by various member-states did slow down and at times de-legitimize EC involvement, however none of these objections appeared to truly disqualify the EC as an influential actor. In these cases member-states reversed or at least compromised their positions. Britain later on agreed to send 1,800 troops (see Chapter One) contributing to UN peacekeeping forces. France became much more involved in the resolution of the conflict, but no longer called for re-unification. Greece, as was discussed in-depth in the preceding chapter, after raising its objections to the EC's recognition of Macedonia, had stated that it would grant a *de facto* recognition if the EC member-states chose to recognize Macedonia. Looking at the German case, one can make the argument that the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was motivated by the perception that international recognition could prevent a crackdown in the republics, a view adopted

later by the Community itself.[131] Thus, the only safe conclusion is that while the EC is emerging as an influential post-Cold War actor which is enjoying increasing levels of autonomy, it is also an actor restrained by the member-states and sensitive to their aspirations.

The Gulf War and the Balkan Crisis exposed a crisis of EC disunity. It would be misleading nevertheless to concentrate on these 'crises' and ignore the increasing influence and power of the EC in the post-Cold War order. This power and influence is the cumulative effect of structural changes that took place in post-World War II Western Europe. The initiatives of governments and corporations initially brought into existence the EC, the world's largest trading bloc, which has now become an influential international actor, adapting rapidly to the challenges of the post-Cold War order. In the Balkans, the political and economic influence of the EC started to be felt from the early 1960s. In the 1980s however, after the expansion of the Community to include the Mediterranean states (Greece, Spain, Portugal), the Community became a stabilizing context for the new democracies in these countries. Political democracy became a precondition for membership and thus, even for countries outside the Community, such as Turkey, the European Community provided incentives for

---

[131] Zelikow (1992: 21), makes this argument, supporting Germany's decision.

the solidification of democracy.[132] Greece has received financial support from the EC, while Turkey and Bulgaria are interested in stronger trade relations. If one moves beyond the rhetoric of the governments in these three countries, one can observe that long existent animosities have been tamed by the supranational influence and incentives of the EC. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the historical antagonisms that have been re-awakened in the region as a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia, although a real threat to stability and peace, have not for the time being, triggered any 'adventurism' on the part of the other Balkan states.

NATO

The collapse of the Soviet Union has given rise to a new debate about the future of NATO. The argument has been made that in light of the new developments in Eastern Europe and the impossibility of a ground attack by Soviet forces into Western Europe, NATO has lost its founding purpose.[133] Others insist that NATO has a major role to play in European security, possibly an expanded one that might include Eastern Europe. Regardless, most have realized that a re-definition and re-allocation of responsibilities is certain to take place, although no one can predict with certainty the nature

---

[132] Most authors examining the Balkans (Braun, 1983; Nelson, 1991; and others) have attributed a democratizing influence to the EC.

[133] A relevant discussion can be found in Chernoff's article, "Can NATO Outlive the USSR?" (International Relations, 11, no.1 (1992): 1-16).

and magnitude of these changes. Theorists that have studied alliances on theoretical grounds have argued that as soon as the threats that keep an alliance together disappear, the dismantling of the alliance usually follows.[134] Whatever the validity of this hypothesis, the present reality indicates that it is probable that an alliance in search of a problem might discover plenty to justify its existence. In the case of NATO, most authors conclude that the capabilities of the organization--logistical, military, personnel, etc.--cannot be matched in the near, and possibly distant, future by any other organizations. The EC, the WEU, the CSCE, and the UN are all lacking the military clout of NATO.

Up to now, NATO has almost been a non-actor in the Balkan Crisis. With the exception of contributing to a naval blockade against Serbia (one that does not seem to have any great effect), NATO appears incapable of more serious interference in the Balkan Crisis. This is due to NATO's institutional structure which deems the organization inappropriate for dealing with a conflict such as the one in Yugoslavia. However, the great military capacity of the organization appears to many to be a great asset that could be utilized in Yugoslavia or in similar conflicts that could emerge in Eastern Europe.

Many authors point out that without a primary role preserved for NATO, a conflict such as the Yugoslavian war can

---

[134] Chernoff, 1992.

only be mismanaged by the slow-moving European Community, and by the defiance of member-states toward Community resolutions. The European leaders therefore, must seize the opportunity to develop a security system that utilizes the NATO structures to their fullest potential. The future of Eastern Europe is uncertain, and the potential for Yugoslavian-type crises is real and that necessitates further linkages between NATO and other institutions and the CSCE, which would give them the necessary military capabilities.

The present situation indicates that NATO will maintain a primary role in the security of Europe. However, it is difficult to speculate on the relations between NATO and the emerging European institutions--the WEU and the CSCE. Furthermore, the declining capacity of the United States has raised questions of the future size and capacity of NATO forces, as well as the role that the US will play in it. While some expect the US to be playing an increasingly minor role, others (Zelikow, 1992) argue that only the US is presently capable of backing diplomacy with military force, and therefore, should maintain a leadership role in NATO and in Europe in general. He argues that a new security system under U.S. leadership is being re-established.

The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC], NATO's involvement with the CSCE--particularly in generating discussions aiming at improving the CSCE's abilities to resolve conflicts--and the Maastricht Treaty's recognition of

NATO's supremacy over WEU actions and decisions, as evidence for the emergence of a new security system where the U.S. and NATO are the cornerstones.[135]

THE UNITED STATES

An analysis of the changing role of the U.S. is essential in that it can shed some light on the direction that the institutional redefinition of Europe might take, especially concerning NATO. It will also allow us to speculate on the possibility of U.S. military involvement in former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, for the purposes of our analysis, it is essential to account for the role that such a powerful actor has played up to now, and speculate on its role in the post-Cold War order. For this, it is necessary to touch upon the general U.S. aspirations in post-Communist Europe. I will attempt to show that the United States' declining capacity as a super-power is forcing it to re-examine its role. A basic characteristic of this process is the awareness of the necessity to reduce the costs of leadership or even accept a less hegemonic position in the post-Cold War order.

The United States agreed that the Yugoslavian war was a 'European matter' and although it remained indirectly involved through consultation (especially in Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Macedonia), it did not challenge the European Community's attempts to resolve the conflict alone. While there was some convergence between the U.S. and the international community

---

[135] Zelikow, 1992: 22-23

on the issue of Serbian aggression, the role of the U.S., in acting to discourage further violence in Croatia and Bosnia, was limited to placing sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, pushing for UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, forbidding Yugoslav Airlines to land on U.S. soil, recommending that the UN accept a resolution condemning detention camps in Bosnia, and agreeing to 'cover' the suggested no-fly zone over Yugoslavia.[136] It should be noted that the Americans have refused to send in ground troops as part of the UN peacekeeping forces. According to Daniel Nelson, the Bush administration lost an historic opportunity to strengthen the UN peacekeeping operations with American forces as early as 1991, "when there was a peace to keep".[137] The aforementioned behaviour of the U.S. reflects some apparent contradictions in foreign policy. While ready to provide military support in establishing a no-fly zone, the U.S. refused to strengthen the UN peacekeeping forces, an attitude that (as will be discussed later in the UN section) reflects the U.S.'s competitive relationship with the UN. Recently however, the Clinton administration appears ready to contribute to the UN peacekeeping forces in support of the Vance-Owen plan if it is accepted by the warring parties. The

---

[136] See Chapter One.

[137] Daniel Nelson, former foreign policy aide to Congressman Richard Gephardt, cited in Arthur Spiegelman, "Americans Wary of Involvement in Bosnian War" The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Thursday, May 6, 1993, A7.

differences between the Bush (1988-1992) and Clinton (1993-) administrations cannot yet be clearly defined, however there are indications that these differences are more real than apparent. In contrast to the Bush administration's assertive new world order rhetoric, the Clinton administration appears more collectivist in its orientation. In a statement on Bosnia, Clinton made it clear that for any American involvement to take place in the Balkans, it would have to have the support of the Europeans.[138] Although this might be classified as a change only in the realm of rhetoric, it can also be seen as signifying a change in American foreign policy. This change is not in my view a break with the past, but a more flexible redefinition of the U.S.'s role in the new Western order. This role is characterized by acknowledging the limitations of U.S. unilateralism and a willingness to cooperate from a less hegemonic position with international institutions and states for the maintenance of the new Western order. The following discussion presents a number of propositions that may offer some insight into the U.S.'s role.

There are a number of dilemmas facing U.S. policy makers in the post-Cold War era. On the one hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union has removed the immediate threat of a Soviet attack, conventional or nuclear, against the West, but on the other hand, it has introduced new security dilemmas--that of

---

[138] CNN News, Wednesday, May 3, 1993.

nuclear proliferation and political instability in Eastern Europe. At first glance, it appears that U.S. foreign policy towards Europe would concentrate on avoiding the threat of nuclear proliferation and would be ready to reduce its military costs in Europe. Although strong voices have been heard in the United States advocating the reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, the United States initially appeared committed to maintaining its leadership in a renewed NATO that would have a main role in the new security arrangements. Cuts in U.S. forces in Europe indicated that the U.S. was seriously attempting to minimize its costs while maintaining institutional leadership. Despite the reduction in military forces, the Bush administration was determined to maintain what is considered a strong U.S. presence overseas.[139] Although the intentions of the Clinton administration are not clear at the present, it appears that a more serious reduction of U.S. forces is considered, as well as a readiness to accept a less hegemonic position in the new Europe.[140]

The reluctance of the Bush administration to engage in a drastic reduction of military forces and its obvious interest in maintaining its status as the 'protector of Europe' in the

---

[139] Robert J. Art, "A US Military Strategy for the 1990s: Reassurance without Dominance" Survival, 34, no.4 (1992): 3.

[140] It is interesting to note that Clinton's election was considered by the French to be 'good news for Europe's autonomous security ambitions'. Moisi, "Cold Shoulders After the Cold War" (Time, 22 Feb 1993: last page).

post-Cold War era, lends support to those who have always argued that the Cold War was a convenient development for the United States and not an inevitable result of Soviet aggression. Chomsky in his latest work, Deterring Democracy, argues that security considerations alone cannot explain the Cold War, since the extremism of U.S. demands increased tensions between the superpowers and guaranteed the continuous flow of military contracts from the U.S. state to a powerful private sector Chomsky calls "a welfare state for the rich".[141] The Cold War also served to maintain U.S. influence over its allies to avoid the emergence of leftist politics in Europe and secure markets for itself. Consequently, an analysis of the post-Cold War era, Chomsky warns, should consider the argument that the Cold War has "half ended".[142] Although the Soviet threat has diminished, U.S. interests are being defined in a similar way as in the past. The Cold War is over, but many of the forces that benefitted and supported its maintenance are still intact, attempting to re-capture the benefits of the previously bipolar world in a now militarily unipolar world. Quoting extensively from the public record, Chomsky illustrates the commitment of the U.S. to exercise military might in order to secure its 'national interests'. Since the world is now

---

[141] Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), 21.

[142] Chomsky, 1992: 59.

unipolar in a military sense (the U.S. being the major global military force), and tripolar in an economic sense, Chomsky argues that a dangerous imbalance is imminent in world politics; an imbalance that the U.S. will exploit to its advantage in the usual militaristic manner. The uniqueness of the post-Cold War era nevertheless, lies in the fact that the U.S. needs Western support for the maintenance of its military machine--a role that it might achieve by renting its military forces for the support of Western interests. An example of a growing willingness to demonstrate at any possible opportunity U.S. might was the Gulf War where as Chomsky and others have pointed out, the military option was the most attractive for the U.S..

Although I share many of Chomsky's views, I think he exaggerates the ability of the U.S. to force itself upon the other two economic blocs because of its military might. However, it should be pointed out that the rhetoric and the Bush administration's lack of cooperation with the Europeans and the UN, were behaviours that at first glance seem to confirm Chomsky's views concerning the role of the U.S. in the new world order. In approaching the institutional restructuring of Europe, the Bush administration had a relatively inflexible attitude. As Rummel (1992) explains, the Bush administration had repeatedly made it clear that it opposed any role that the European Community might play that would undermine NATO's command structure or that would allow

for unilateral actions by the Europeans without NATO's consent. In this light, the European involvement in the Balkan crisis, both by the EC and by member-states, could have been seen as an indirect threat to NATO's command structure and consequently, U.S. leadership. Following Chomsky's rationale, one could perceive the instability in the Balkans as a security threat for Europe that provides an opportunity for the U.S. and NATO to prove their utility. Such a point of view would not consider it incidental that the U.S. promised to establish a 'no-fly zone' over Bosnia only after Jacques Delors had acknowledged openly the inability of the EC to enforce its decisions and asked for U.S. support.

Chomsky's (1992) account of U.S. motives in the post-Cold War era however, cannot explain the more passive role that the U.S. has taken toward the crisis thereafter. It would be simplistic to assume that in its relations with Europe the U.S. is primarily preoccupied with finding a function for its military apparatus. Economic relations, especially concerning trade, are occupying a central importance in the relations between the U.S. and the EC. The possibility of a breakdown in GATT talks and the consequent trade wars are developments that both sides want to avoid. In light of this complex relationship between Europe and the U.S., one should not be quick to assume (as Chomsky in my view has been), U.S. assertiveness in the post-Cold War era based on the evidence of U.S. behaviour during the Cold War.

Robert Art argues in "A U.S. Military Strategy for the 1990's: Reassurance Without Dominance" (1992), that U.S. leadership, if it is to survive, should avoid provocation. The author is confident that the WEU, still in a formative stage, cannot provide a substitute for NATO in securing Western interests. Since the enforcing capabilities of the UN are almost non-existent, the only obvious option in the new world order is U.S. leadership. Art suggests that it is now a necessity for the U.S. to use its military power carefully, and when it does so, to "avoid actions that smack of arrogant unilateralism".[143] The author goes further to explain that while during the Cold War U.S. leadership was a necessity for Western states (a necessity imposed mostly by the U.S. in Chomsky's view), in the post-Cold War environment, 'unilateralism' will trigger counter coalitions to U.S. leadership. There is plenty of evidence to argue that the U.S. in its relations with European states and the EC has long realized the need for tactful leadership. Even under the Bush administration it appears that U.S. leadership has been 'tamed'. The emergence and evolution of the Western European Union did not encounter resistance, despite the obvious challenges it poses to NATO and to U.S. leadership. Opposing such a development would have created more willingness by the European states to be opposed to U.S. leadership. However, the absence of visible opposition to an autonomous European

---

[143] Art, 1992: 21.

security structure should not be interpreted as indifference. As Vernet points out,

> *...Washington encouraged the efforts of Europe towards unification when it was a question of promoting reconstruction, but viewed them with suspicion when the Europeans showed signs of acting autonomously; the Americans call on the Europeans to spend more on their own defence, but are worried when the French and Germans put in place an embryonic European defence force....* [144]

However, under the Clinton administration, Washington appears more genuinely interested in removing itself further from the responsibilities and costs of leadership. This should not be misinterpreted as a trend toward American isolationism, but as a pragmatic assessment of the U.S.'s capabilities in the post-Cold War order. These capabilities dictate that if U.S. leadership over NATO and Western European forces is to continue, the Europeans must share the costs. U.S. involvement in European affairs cannot have the interventionist character that it had in the 1960s and the 1970s and, to a lesser extent, in the 1980s. Its involvement can only be negotiated; and the power to negotiate from an advantageous position is what U.S. policy is facing in the 1990s. The Balkan crisis in the 1990s can only involve the U.S. in coordination with EC objectives. At present, the urgency of the Balkan crisis, the challenges from Eastern Europe and the drawbacks of the Maastricht treaty (in which a final resolution on security questions was avoided, fearing

---

[144] Vernet, 1992.

the polarization of EC member-states), are developments that enhance the bargaining power of the U.S. in playing a major role in Europe's new security arrangements. If this is indeed the case, then it appears that the Balkan Crisis 'proves' the need for the continued usefulness of NATO in Europe, and along with it, a primary role for the United States. Under the Clinton administration, however, this role appears to have a more collectivist orientation, i.e., a more cooperative, less hegemonic stance toward international institutions and states and aiming toward the strengthening of the new Western order in Europe. American interventionism seems to be giving way to the collective interventionism of international institutions and states in the new Western order.

Clinton's administration is, according to Stedman (1993), sympathetic to what he calls 'the new interventionism'. This interventionism however, if put into practice should not be assumed as effective, especially when it confronts the challenges of civil war, such as the one in former Yugoslavia. Stedman warns that the U.S. needs not to engage in a more assertive policy, i.e., one that attempts to enforce peace between the warring factions, especially when such a position could be costly financially and in terms of human lives. In his view, humanitarian considerations and unrealistic faith in the capabilities of the new interventionists, should not overwhelm pragmatic thinking. Rather than engaging in peace enforcement operations in Bosnia, the U.S. should only be

concerned with the larger security question, i.e., withholding the expansion of the crisis. As Stedman indicates,

> *Action against Serbia should only be to deter aggression against Kosovo and Macedonia, to prevent escalation to interstate war and to weaken Serbia's capability to carry out further attacks. U.N. military intervention should not aim to end the war in Bosnia. U.N. troops would find themselves fighting a protracted guerrilla war. The war in Bosnia should be ended politically or militarily by the territory's various warring groups.*[145]

Although at this point it may be premature to be conclusive about the U.S.'s role, it appears that Stedman's reservations for UN peace enforcements in Bosnia, backed by the U.S., are shared by the American public and many policy makers. In a recent poll, 60% of Americans opposed sending U.S. ground troops to Bosnia, while only 27% were in favour.[146] In light of this, the fate of Bosnian Muslims seems bleak, since it is highly improbable that the Clinton administration will engage in an unpopular operation, especially when no vital U.S. interests are at stake. At the same time, indications exist that the crisis will not expand southward since Western military intervention faces clearer battle lines, while support for such intervention may generate greater consensus.

## INSTITUTIONAL REDEFINITION AND COOPERATION

### The United Nations

The post-Cold War era has opened new possibilities about

---

[145] Stedman, 1993: 14-15.

[146] Spiegelman, 1993: A7.

the role of the United Nations. As Stiles and Macdonald point out, the UN's successes in hostage releases in Lebanon, negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, the end of the ideological conflict between East and West in the UN, the end of anti-UN rhetoric, first by the Reagan (1980-1988) and then by the Bush administration in the United States, have increased expectations that the future role of the United Nations will be greatly expanded to deal with and provide solutions for problems such as the Yugoslav crisis and nuclear proliferation.[147] Most authors examined, have accepted that the post-Cold War era has opened a new chapter in the history of the United Nations organization. A consensus is emerging as to what actions by states are unacceptable in the international community.[148] The Gulf crisis is seen to have played a primary role in forcing this consensus into the centre of attention. While in the post-Cold War era the consensus should not be taken as everlasting and unbreakable, it has certainly reinforced a minimal moral consensus. A shift toward the strengthening of international norms in a more interventionist direction is evident in the decisions of European states and the U.S. to extend the CSCE principles of the inviolability of borders to the Yugoslavian case, where

---

147 Kendall W. Stiles and Maryellen Macdonald, "After Consensus, What? Performance Criteria for the UN in the Post-Cold War Era" Journal of Peace Research, 29, no.3 (1992): 299-311.

148 Hurrel, 1992.

internal and unrecognized borders were violated.[149] Violations of human rights and of territory are now more broadly condemned in the international environment.[150] However, condemnations of violations alone are not enough to stop a conflict like the present one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As of February, 1993, there are 14,000 troops in former Yugoslavia, but despite the present formal truce between Croats and Serbs, fighting has continued in Croatia and in Bosnia. It is being estimated that the Vance-Owen plan to divide Bosnia into 10 separate divisions would require approximately 20,000 troops to patrol. The issue of the size of peacekeeping forces required is being debated, however, within the European defense ministries and NATO it has been totalled at anywhere from 200,000 to 600,000 troops.[151] At the moment, there seems to be some political will in Europe and the U.S., to provide such numbers of troops. In light of this, the efforts by the UN provide some hope.

Critics have argued that the United Nations at present does not reflect the balance of economic and political power globally; an argument that although appealing in its

---

[149] Zelikow, 1992: 19

[150] Greece's latest condemnation of Serbian aggression and atrocities (CNN World Report, December, 1992) is a good example of this. The international outcry against Serbian atrocities forced Greece to re-examine its position towards Serbia, historically and presently (where it concerns the Macedonian Question) an ally.

[151] James L. Graff and J. F. O. McAllister "The Guns Talk Too" Time Magazine, 22 Feb 1993: 25.

rationale, has not convinced the permanent members of the Security Council to consider a restructuring of the organization. Furthermore, the Gulf War was not only an achievement of the Western world condemning and resisting an aggressor, but was an exercise of political manipulation of the UN by the United States. According to Chomsky, Hurrel and others, the United States' foreign policy goals were advanced through unilateral initiatives by the United States that decreased the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In evaluating, therefore, the potential and actual role that the UN has and will have for the Balkan crisis, it is important to examine the relation between the UN's mandate and the power and interests of the main states still maintaining an advantageous position within the organization. As Hurrel (1992) points out, while the main question of collective security is 'who has committed aggression?' the question of foreign policy is different: 'what interests do I have in opposing this particular aggressor, and what power with which to oppose him?'. Thus, while we might see consensual condemnations of aggression, we cannot expect similar enthusiasm from major states, especially the U.S., in the enforcement of UN resolutions.

The United Nations, according to Duke, faces a paradox: "never before has it had the potential to do so much yet, at the same time, it has never been in such dire financial

straits".[152] Despite Bush's rhetorical support for the UN in 1992, the United States came short US$34.7 million in honouring its obligations to the organization. As Chomsky and others have argued, the United States has paid attention only to the UN resolutions that it initiated or were in accordance with its interests and has repeatedly ignored all condemnations and criticisms against itself. The debt of the U.S. to the UN should not be taken lightly, because as Duke has pointed out, it is a matter of political will and not an inability to pay. Repeatedly, in the U.S. congress the view has been expressed that financial obligations to international organizations should be honoured only if they secure U.S. interests. The attitude of the U.S. Congress therefore, seems to indicate that the strengthening of the UN as an international institution may not be in the best perceived interests of the U.S.. The strengthening of the UN might increase its potential in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities and decrease the need for U.S. involvement either diplomatically or militarily, for resolving a particular international conflict. However, the aforementioned behaviour of the U.S. toward the UN, should not distract us from observing that the UN has gained in legitimacy, expanded its functions and despite the financial difficulties, its role appears strengthened as its operations and goals become linked

---

[152] Simon Duke, "The UN Finance Crisis: A History and Analysis" International Relations, no date available (1992), 147.

with that of other institutions (WEU, CSCE, NATO). With the exception of Chomsky, most authors agree that U.S. actions in the post-Cold War order will increasingly depend on the moral justification and legitimation provided by the UN. Although exceptions cannot be excluded, the post-Cold War order has added immense pressure to U.S. unilateralism.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]

The end of the Cold War did not merely eliminate superpower rivalry, it forced a re-examination of Western values and institutions, and opened up opportunities for institutional development everywhere. The amount of consultation in Western Europe has increased dramatically in the last few years. European states discuss their problems within the EC, the WEU, NATO, the CSCE and many other secondary settings. Since 1989, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] has extended its human right guarantees and has developed new and more extensive consultative structures.[153] On November 21, 1990, the Charter of Paris was signed institutionalizing the CSCE and officially declaring an end to the Cold War. The CSCE was unable to meet the Yugoslavian challenge because its institutional structure was capable of confronting a mythical, but not a real, Europe.[154] The CSCE continues to operate on the principle of unanimity; a principle that has limited the

---

153 Zelikow, 1992: 13.

154 Ghebali, 1992: 3.

organization's potential for more assertive involvement in the Yugoslavian crisis. However, the restructuring and redefining of the organization that is underway, are not simply "new institutional castles in the sky".[155]

The Fourth Follow-Up Meeting (Helsinki process), held from March to July 1992, led to important decisions for the development of the CSCE's institutional framework to accommodate the changing concepts of security in Europe and to expand upon the three main Helsinki decisions: the creation of a High commissioner for National Minorities [HCNM][156]; the strengthening of the CSCE to conduct peacekeeping operations; and the creation of a "Forum for Security Cooperation". The areas of concern were human and minority rights issues, the concept of global security, and cooperation with organizations and institutions--transatlantic, European and international. It also involved the redefining and redistributing of responsibilities over human rights issues over which the CSCE was in strong competition with the Council of Europe.[157] In the area of security, the role of the CSCE, through the

---

[155] Zelikow, 1992: 20.

[156] The role of the HCNM is to identify the potential for conflict at early stages and initiate "activation of informal good offices". It allows the CSCE to confront national minority problems from a security point of view also, and not only human rights.

[157] This is significant because human dimension issues stopped being a jurisdiction of a relatively non-representative organization like the Council of Europe, to a larger pan-European one (such as the CSCE).

Conflict Prevention Centre [CPC], in European security arrangements continues to expand. Attempts to establish links to Japan, non-participating Mediterranean states, working relations with European, transatlantic organizations such as NATO, EC, WEU, etc., and the strengthening of relations with Non-Governmental Organizations reveal the global scope of the CSCE and the potential availability of expertise and resources. I'nding complementary roles in the CSCE's geopolitical jurisdiction while guaranteeing the cooperation and support, rather than competition, of such institutions as NATO, the EC, the Council of Europe, and WEU, was the main motivation behind the decision-making at this conference.

These important developments were accompanied by the understanding that "....the CSCE must now become an effective instrument for managing the positive and perverse effects of the peaceful transformations...." occurring within and outside of Europe.[158] As Joffe points out, there is great potential for a consolidated CSCE in the post-Cold War era. The 48-nation CSCE is the most inclusive institution that can formulate codes of behaviour, can arbitrate conflicts, especially of the kind in former Yugoslavia, can become a forum where conflicting parties can take their quarrels, and can confront transnational problems of pollution, migration, etc. However, Joffe warns against unrealistic optimism that attributes to the CSCE peacemaking capacities that it does not

---

[158] Ghebali, 1992: 5.

have. In the nuclear age, if the major powers (Russia, the U.S., France, England) were to engage in a conflict, the principle of common security--all against one (against the violator)--becomes irrelevant since the ability of one actor to strike back can deter all others from enforcing collective security. However, it should be noted that an aggressor need not be a powerful state possessing nuclear weapons (an unlikely scenario at the moment), as Serbian aggression has demonstrated. A small state or even a powerful political or ethnic group can deem the CSCE ineffective.

Joffe's points are insightful in that they make clear that international peace depends first on the good relations between states and only after on the contributions of international institutions.[159] In this work, Joffe's argument concerning the limitations of international institutions is for the most part accepted. It is in light of the present relations among the great powers, and the present trends, that indicate a rapid improvement in relations--especially concerning military matters--that are suggesting that the present institutional restructuring will most probably continue on its present path, i.e., international institutions with more enforcing capacity, cooperating with each other, and supported by the major states. This capacity, however, at the moment remains a wishful projection rather than a concrete, observable reality.

---

[159] Joffe, 1992: 36-50.

The limitations facing the CSCE because of its emphasis on consensual decision-making, have already become obvious in the Yugoslavian war, where the differences among states predominated over an institutional response. However, this emphasis is useful in increasing the legitimacy of and in the strengthening of this pan-European institution. It is also contributing to a normatively more cohesive Europe, since any institutional progress that may take place emerges from an inclusive process. Furthermore, one should not exclude the possibility that with time a consolidated CSCE might move to majority voting on many issues following the example of the EC.

## SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

In recent years, important changes have occurred at the international system level. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the increasing influence of Germany and Japan in world politics and the European integration process, brought an end to bipolarity and paved the way to the uncertain consequences of a multipolar world. These changes have given rise to a theoretical debate among international relation theorists who are examining and comparing the virtues and vices of a presently multipolar world, to that of a bipolar world. Miller (1992) points out that many theorists, especially from the realist camp, have come to accept a Waltzian perspective, where a bipolar world is perceived as more stable and prospects for peace in the post-Cold War Europe are

pessimistic.[160] Although the present instability in the Balkans and Eastern Europe seems to confirm this hypothesis, in this work the view maintained is that a multipolar order provides more incentives for peace in Europe, is institutionally more flexible and agile to adapt to new challenges, and if stability is achieved, will be more permanent and more consensual. As Kegley and Raymond (1992) point out, the security of the previously bipolar world should not be assumed as stable since it was "crisis ridden", it generated mistrust and the consequent arms race between the super-powers, and was characterized by zero-sum politics that constantly increased tension.[161] In short, it was the Cold War and the politics of domination that hindered the development of political solutions to ethnic and other problems, and democratic institutional development in parts of the world (Balkans-Eastern Europe).

Although a thorough analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of both worlds (multipolar and bipolar) is beyond the scope of this work, an argument has been made that resembles closely that of the liberal camp and the Kantian tradition that views democratization as a contributing force to international peace. Institutional linking and

---

[160] Benjamin Miller, "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management" World Politics, 45 (Oct, 1992): 1-46.

[161] Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond "Must We Fear a Post-Cold War Multipolar System?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36, no.3 (1992): 573-585.

cooperation, trade relations, and the transition to free-market economies are all seen as systemic changes that are providing incentives for peace and moving away from nationalist to supranationalist politics.[162]

In the present international environment, the creation of a new nation-state continues to be a problematic and inconsistent process that is not based on universal, observable criteria. The wave of new national states forming after the collapse of the communist bloc, caught Western governments unprepared. Although respect for human rights and democratic politics has become an important prerequisite of the international community, such developments do not guarantee the international recognition of the newly-formed state. As Richard Falk (1992) points out, the Yugoslavian crisis highlighted the double standard that existed in the international environment in the post-Cold War era when the opposing claims of minority rights and national stability appear simultaneously. The claims of twelve million Kurds in Turkey have not received any attention because of Turkey's strategic importance in curtailing Islamic fundamentalism. As with Basque, Corsican, and East Timorese claims, the United Nations continues to insist that no claim of self-determination should be supported if it contributes to the

---

[162] Miller, 1992.

dismemberment of an existing state.[163] In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, Germany's, Austria's and Italy's interest in expanding each one's zone of influence, and the fact that Yugoslavia had no strategic importance like Turkey does for the United States, were according to Falk, evidence of the new laissez-faire geo-politics. The European Community is according to Falk responsible for not providing adequate assistance and incentives to maintain the unity of former Yugoslavia. Although Falk's argument is convincing, it should be noted that he understates the domestic and historical factors that contributed to the breakup of Yugoslavia. Although one cannot discount his argument, that the incentives provided by the supranational actor were not adequate, one wonders if any amount of economic aid could have contained Milosevic's and Tudjman's nationalisms. It should also be noted that the European Community, not being a limitless source of funding, had shown immense interest in assisting and securing the unity of Yugoslavia.[164] However, these incentives provided by the supranational actor were not enough to reverse the effects of a troublesome transition to

---

[163] Richard Falk, "The New Laissez-Faire Geopolitics" Breakdown: War and Reconstruction in Yugoslavia (UK: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1992), 57-59.

[164] "Integration of Yugoslavia into Processes in Europe" Yugoslav Survey, no.2 (1990): 49-58. This document illustrates that, at the time when the Yugoslavian crisis was erupting, steps were being taken to include Yugoslavia in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

democracy from Communist rule and rising nationalisms.

Despite the conflictual and uncertain beginning, the post-Cold War/post-Gulf War international environment appears promising for peace in the long run. The incentives for peace are mostly provided by supranational developments in the EC and elsewhere, and seem to strengthen a new, more dynamic, democratic capitalist order. Simultaneously, a wave of institutional links between the main international institutions (the EC, CSCE, WEU, NATO and the UN) also characterize the post-Cold War era. One might also perceive a serious change in attitudes emerging both from political elites and publics that are supportive of international solutions.

As Zaslavsky points out, the ethnic conflict in the post-Communist world should not distract us from taking an historical perspective and realizing that the present international environment holds "greater possibilities for international co-operation and conflict resolution than ever before."[165] It is becoming apparent that human rights have ceased to be exclusively an internal issue for governments--even if these governments are democratically elected. An international order is emerging where the rights of ethnic minorities have started to precede the imperative of national sovereignty. Traditional nationalism is encountering an

---

[165] Victor Zaslavsky, "Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies." Daedalus, Spring, 121, no.2 (1992): 97.

international order that monitors and condemns such violations.[166] Although the effect of the emerging international order seems non-existent in the Yugoslavian conflict, it can be observed in the policies of other Balkan states.

An important development in the Post-Cold War era is the role that the EC as a supranational actor is playing in defining the institutional future of Europe. Beyond the stronger links that the EC is developing with other international institutions, the EC is emerging as the most powerful institution with political and economic clout, of the post-Cold War order. As Rummel points out, the EC and its members do not face at the moment a serious threat of 'renationalization' despite falling short in meeting a number of expectations. The member states and European institutions are geared toward further integration and a stronger role in the security of Europe.

In my analysis of the EC, I have adopted the position that Rosenau has taken concerning the UN. Both organizations owe their existence to the willingness of member-states to create and sustain them.[167] Both are still heavily influenced by the interests and will of the major states. However, both have become a context that is above the ability

---

[166] Zaslavsky, 1992: 118.

[167] James N. Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).

of each member-state to change, but a context that each member-state can hope to influence. Both organizations have benefitted by the changing conditions of the post-Cold War order, and the globalization of the democratic capitalist order. The UN faces a growing consensus between states, fewer possibilities for the exercising of vetoes, and a more democratized world. The EC despite the shortcomings in foreign policy and some steps backward in the process of integration, enjoys an unparalleled status in that states within and outside the Community are attentive to its objectives and willing to engage in restructuring. In relation to the Balkan Crisis, both organizations show a higher level of involvement than ever before, and both have confronted their inadequacy to stop the conflict. A high level of cooperation seems to replace the initial disunity of the EC. This institutional convergence was also observed in the actions of other organizations despite initial competition. NATO, the Western European Union and the CSCE, are showing a willingness to coordinate their actions and cooperate with each other. However, the increased levels of communication have not so far resulted in the creation of political/military mechanisms that could effectively bring about an end to a conflict, such as the one in former Yugoslavia. Although it is premature at this point to make an argument for the future effectiveness of these organizations to prevent such conflicts, or to bring to a halt a conflict

already in existence, evidence indicates that this possibility cannot be ruled out. The creation of Euro-corps, the expanding role of the CSCE and WEU, and their increasing cooperation with the UN, the redefinition of NATO's role toward the new security threats, and the experience and challenge of the Balkan Crisis, are all contributing to the emergence of an institutionally more capable and diverse international environment.

Presently however, we are witnessing the genocide of Muslims and the international community's unwillingness to use assertive action. The UN peacekeeping forces only seem to postpone the inevitable killings. The US-sponsored 'no-fly' zone and the humanitarian food drops appear to have more symbolic significance than real impact. One wonders if the successful extermination of Bosnian Muslims will mean the opening of a new front in Kosovo or Macedonia. The withdrawal of Serbian troops from Macedonia and the limited scale of repression in Kosovo seem to have, for the moment, eased fears for a southern expansion of the crisis. One can only hope that a combination of international pressure and an unwillingness to spark the Balkan powder keg on the part of Serbian nationalists, will prevent the intensification of the crisis.

# CONCLUSION

There were three main goals in this work. On one level, I attempted to understand and evaluate the role and impact that the main international actors/states and international institutions had in the Balkan Crisis, as well as understand the regional dynamics and the historical causes of the crisis. On another level, I was interested in the development of a framework that would place the actions and interactions of these actors into perspective. The theme 'nationalism versus supranationalism' proved useful as a context for describing international politics related to the crisis and as a main descriptive component of the emerging international order. Nationalist sentiments and politics were seen as factors preventing or delaying the emergence of consensus in the post-Cold War order. Nationalist sentiments in Greece, Macedonia, Germany, limited the manoeuvrability of political leaders and periodically delegitimized the mediating activities of the EC, while nationalist politics (i.e., Germany's push for the recognition of the breakaway republics, competition between France, Britain, Germany and the U.S. over the institutional future of Europe), contributed to divisions that hindered the effectiveness of the international response to the crisis. Supranational developments on the other hand, were seen to

accommodate the emergence of an institutionally and normatively more cohesive world order. The supranational influence of the EC, manifested in the willingness of peripheral states to join in the EC process and the attentiveness that Balkan states (Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria) showed to EC mediating initiatives, are seen as a new and unique influence on the Balkan scene that provides hope for peace. The nationalist strife between the warring factions in former Yugoslavia as well as the nationalist politics and sentiments observed in other European states, were seen as a challenge to supranational developments, and consequently, to an overall emerging consensus in the post-Cold War order. This challenge however, though imperative, appears contained, and not capable of seriously threatening the emerging consensus. The potential threats posed by an all-out Balkan war (disruption of trade relations, refugee problems, and security threats for EC member-states) supported an emerging consensus centred around the issue of peace and stability in the region. While my focus was on the influence that Western European supranational developments have had on the Balkan states and the crisis, the analysis of the post-Cold War order brought forward the realization that the new world order is being restructured to accommodate supranational actors and give them a greater role in the politics of international relations.

The institutional changes that are taking place, and the

competition among states and institutions in defining these changes, are major components of the aforementioned restructuring and became a useful focus for explaining state actions and for evaluating the impact of international institutions in the Balkan Crisis. Institutional activities can be measured and evaluated to one extent or another (after all mediation, aid, peacekeeping, providing forums for discussion, etc, are activities that in part must contribute to stability), however, the overall normative effect of institutional activities is harder to pinpoint as a political force. For these reasons, the development of the theme of normative change was limited to some quantitative statements that described the new international status quo as being more influenced by democratic human rights-oriented discourse, more united in its condemnation of human rights violations and more susceptible to public opinion. In this light, institutions such as the United Nations enjoy more legitimacy, support and its mandates appear more strongly united than in the past. These quantitative differences--if accepted--do constitute a great qualitative difference and an important break with the past.

A problem that appears in every major work on the Balkans, and consequently, here as well, is the constant dilemma of sorting through numerous events and actions of political actors, while maintaining a sound relation with one's theoretical framework. Almost all works encountered

concerning the Balkans, being historical or contemporary in focus, have tended to be more descriptive in nature at the expense of an overall argument. Despite these weaknesses, a number of conclusions can be drawn from this work concerning the Balkan crisis presently and for the future. The influence of the democratic capitalist order in the Balkans does not fit neatly into categories such as positive or negative. While the new order is institutionally centred on the maintenance of peace, political democracy and market liberalization (at least within economic blocs if not between them), these commitments have not always been materialized. States' attempts to capture spheres of economic influence combined with nationalist sentiment and objectives (as in the German case) limited the chances for political solutions and contributed greatly to Balkan nationalism. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was greatly facilitated by the absence of institutional measures that would guarantee individual and minority rights and by the abuse of democratic principles and procedures by nationalists of the different ethnic groups. The West uncritically greeted referendums of independence as expressions of popular will before acknowledging the concerns of the minority groups, providing false hope for support for the seceding republics

The Balkan Crisis and the war in former Yugoslavia continues to occupy a central importance in the agenda of states and international organizations. Despite the intensity

of the conflict and the uncertain future of the region, the conditions for stable and lasting peace do exist. These conditions have been created both by political developments in Balkan states, namely the solidification of Greek-Turkish democracies and the emergence of new democracies in previously Communist states. The most important factor for peace, however, was seen to be the supranational and institutional developments in Western Europe. Nationalism continues to be a serious, but for the most part not life-threatening, challenge to the emerging supranationalism of Western Europe, while it remains a more potent force in the Balkans. However, even Balkan nationalism has been seriously tamed when compared to Balkan nationalisms in the beginning of this century. As was argued, the Macedonian Question in a previous era would have been solved by the usual manner of partition among the major states. Although for the moment the questions of Macedonia and Kosovo remain open, there are many indications that there still is hope that the crisis will not expand to these areas. It is even probable that military intervention on the part of the West might take place in order to secure the safety of the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic groups and avoid a greater Balkan war.

Although some degree of competition between NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE is delaying the emergence of an institutional order that is more cohesive in its response and less ambiguous in its jurisdictional composition, the overall

trends indicate that the institutional redefinition and restructuring that is taking place in the post-Cold War era is signalling the emergence of such an order. Despite their differences, these international institutions are displaying a willingness and ability to coordinate their activities and to cooperate towards further institutional linking. Furthermore, no solid anti-institutional position characterizes at present the foreign policy of any of the major states as was the case with US foreign policy during the Reagan years (I am referring here to the anti-UN rhetoric of the Reagan administration, 1980-1988). The end of the Cold War has opened the space for institutional redefinition, and major states appear more interested in joining the process rather than opposing it.

The international response to the Yugoslavian war through mediation, aid, sanctions, and peacekeeping activities, despite its shortcomings, is seen as the determining factor in containing a southern expansion of the crisis. However, it has also been made clear that the emerging democratic capitalist order is at the moment incapable of adequately interfering against an international aggressor or a regime that practices domestic repression. This is particularly the case if the violator/actor is not threatening vital interests of the powerful states. It has been argued, that the slow and non-preventative nature of the international response was due to the fact that the war in former Yugoslavia did not threaten

any Western 'vital interests', at least initially, to the extent that the invasion of Kuwait had. When the prospects for an all-out Balkan war were speculated about however, Western states and institutions showed unprecedented interest in resolving the crisis.

While the United States, under the Bush administration, responded to the crisis with rhetorical, pro-human rights statements and an old-fashioned, inflexible position on the institutional development in Europe, under the Clinton administration, it appears now to be moving toward the acceptance of a less hegemonic position, one more willing to allow European institutions and states to exert more autonomy in maintaining European security. Although the United States is still interested in maintaining a major role for NATO and itself in the new Europe, this interest has not resulted in an aggressive foreign policy but in a rather reserved stance that interferes little with most European initiatives related to security. It has limited itself to increased consultation with states in the region in which the EC exerts the least influence (Albania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia). The warnings that the U.S. iterated against Serbian aggression on Kosovo or Macedonia, though for the moment not very helpful for Bosnian Muslims, do provide some hope that the crisis will not extend southward into these areas.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Altmann, Franz-Lothar (1992) "Ex-Yugoslavia's Neighbours: Who Wants What?" The World Today, 48, no.8-9: 163-165.

Andrejevich, Milan (1990a) "Yugoslav Macedonians Demand Greece's Recognition of Aegean Macedonians" Report on Eastern Europe, 1 June: 45-49.

Andrejevich, Milan (1990b) "Crisis in Croatia and Slovenia: Proposal for a Confederal Yugoslavia" Report on Eastern Europe, 2 Nov: 28-33.

Andrejevich, Milan (1991a) "A Week of Great Political Importance" Report on Eastern Europe, 18 Jan: 26-30.

Andrejevich, Milan (1991b) "Crisis in Croatia: The Pakrac Drama" Report on Eastern Europe, 22 March: 37-41.

Andrejevich, Milan (1991c) "Resurgent Nationalism in Macedonia: A Challenge to Pluralism" Report on Eastern Europe, 17 May: 27.

Andrejevich, Milan (1991d) "Croatia and Slovenia Propose Separation of Yugoslav Republics" Report on Eastern Europe, 15 March: 28.

Andrejevich, Milan (1991c) "The Yugoslav Crisis: No Solution in Sight" Report on Eastern Europe, 22 Feb: 38.

Art, Robert J. (1992) "A US Military Strategy for the 1990s: Reassurance without Dominance" Survival, 34 no.4 (Winter): 3-23.

Bowers, Stephen R. (1992) "Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe" Conflict Studies, no.248, Feb: 1-26.

Chernoff, Fred (1992) "Can NATO Outlive the USSR?" International Relations, 11, no.1: 1-16.

Chomsky, Noam (1992) Deterring Democracy (New York: Hill and Wang).

Cohen, Lenard J. (1992) "Disintegration of Yugoslavia" Current History, 91, no.568, Nov: 369-375.

Craig, Albert M., et al. The Heritage of World Civilizations (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986).

Duke, Simon (1992) "The UN Finance Crisis: A History and Analysis" International Relations, no date available.

East European Reporter (1992a) "Countdown: A Chronology of Yugoslavia's Final Months" Jan/Feb: 5.

East European Reporter (1992b) "The War In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Continued: 1 September-31 October" Nov/Dec: 64-67.

Falk, Richard (1992) "The New Laissez-Faire Geopolitics" Breakdown: War and Reconstruction in Yugoslavia (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting), pp.57-59.

Gage, Nicholas (1993) (Special to the Washington Post) "Kosovo a Political Powder-keg" The Edmonton Journal, 18 April: A8.

Ghebali, Victor-Yves (1992) "The July CSCE Helsinki decisions--a step in the right direction" Nato Review, 40, no.4: 3-9.

Glenny, Misha (1992) "The Third Balkan War" Breakdown: War and Restructuring in Yugoslavia (U.K.: Institute for War and Peace Reporting), pp.5-6.

Graff, James L. and J. F. O. McAllister (1993) "The Guns Talk Too" Time, 22 Feb: 25.

Hettne, Bjorn (1991) "Security and Peace in Post-Cold War Europe" Journal of Peace Research, 28, no.3: 279-294.

Horsley, William (1992) "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins: A Critique of German Foreign Policy" Millennium: Journal of International Studies, no.2: 225-241.

Hurrell, Andrew (1992) "Collective Security and International Order Revisited" International Relations (no date available).

Keesing's Record of World Events: News Digest..., January to December 1992 inclusive, news items collected under the heading "Europe" and "Former Yugoslavia" and "Ex-Yugoslavia" (London: Longman).

Kegley, Charles W., Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond (1992) "Must We Fear a Post-Cold War Multipolar System?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36, no.3: 573-585.

Keohane, Robert O. (1989) International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).

Kramer, S. P. (1991) "Western Europe's 'Eastern Question'", The World Today, Dec: 213.

Larrabee, F. Stephen (1990/91) "Long Memories and Short Fuses" International Security, 15, no.3: 58-91.

Larrabee, F. Stephen (1992) "Instability and Change in the Balkans" Survival, 34, no.2: 31-49.

Licht, Sonja and Mary Kaldor (1992) "Nationalism and War, Civil Society and Peace" Breakdown: War and Reconstruction in Yugoslavia (U.K.: Institute for War and Peace Reporting).

Ligeros, Stavros (1992) Skopia: To 'Aqkathi' tis Balkanikis (Athens: A. A. Livani and Sia E. E.).

Mastnak, Tomaz (1992) "And Is No More" East European Reporter, Jan-Feb: 3-7.

Miall, Hugh (1992) Breakdown: War and Reconstruction in Yugoslavia (U.K.: Institute for War and Peace Reporting).

Miller, Benjamin (1992) "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management" World Politics, 45 (Oct): 1-46.

Moore, Patrick (1990) "The Macedonian Question Resurfaces." Report on Eastern Europe, 6 April: 46-69.

Nelson, Daniel (1991) The Balkan Imbroglio (Chicago: Westview Press).

Peacekeeping and International Relations (1992a) 21, no.2 (May/June).

Ibid., (1992b) 21, no.3-4 (July/August).

Ibid., (1992c) 21, no.5 (Sept/Oct).

Pettifer, James (1992) "The New Macedonian Question" International Affairs, 68: 175-185.

Pieterse, Jan Nederveen (1991) "Fictions of Europe" Race and Class, 32, no.3: 3-10.

"Weekly Report", Report on Eastern Europe, under the sub-heading "Yugoslavia" from September 1990 to December 1991, inclusive.

Rosenau, James N. (1992) The United Nations in a Turbulent World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

Rummel, Reinhardt (1991-92) "Integration, Disintegration, and Security in Europe: Preparing the Community for a Multi-institutional Response" International Journal, 47 (Winter): 64-92.

Salmon, Trevor (1992) "Tests for European Cooperation, 1990-1992." International Affairs 68, no.2: 233-253.

Smith, Anthony D. (1992) Theories of Nationalism (New York: Holmes and Meier).

Smith, Helena (1992a) "Greece Fires Minister over Macedonia" The Guardian, 14 April: 8.

Smith, Helena (1992b) "Macedonian Crisis for Greek PM" The Guardian, 17 April: 10.

Speigelman, Arthur (1993) "Americans Wary of Involvement in Bosnian War" The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 6 May: A7.

Stedman, Stephen John (1993) "The New Interventionists" Foreign Affairs 72, no.1: 1-16.

Stiles, Kendall W. and Maryellen Macdonald (1992) "After Consensus, What? Performance Criteria for the UN in the Post-Cold War Era" Journal of Peace Research, 29, no.3: 299-311.

Times (London), 26 Aug 1991: 10a.

Times (London), 8 Nov 1991: 11e.

Times (London), 13 Nov 1991: 13h.

Torov, Ivan (1992) "100 Days of Panic", East European Reporter, Nov-Dec: 75-76.

Vernet, Daniel (1992) "The dilemma of French foreign policy" International Affairs, 68, no.4: 655.

To Vima tis Kiriakis, "I Tourkia stelnei strato yia epemvasi sta Balkania" 22 November 1992, 1.

Weller, Marc (1992) "Piggy in the Middle" New Statesman and Society, 25 Sept: 32-33.

Yugoslav Survey (1990) "Integration of Yugoslavia into Integration Processes in Europe," no.2: 49-58.

Zaslavsky, Victor (1992) "Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies." Daedalus, 121, no.2: 97.

Zelikow, Philip (1992) "The New Concert of Europe" Survival, 34, no.2: 12-30.

# APPENDIX

## YUGOSLAVIA, 1991